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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TECHNICAL DATA  
AND COMPUTER SOFTWARE RIGHTS PROCUREMENT  
IN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS 
ABSTRACT 
 Intellectual property and intellectual property rights play an important role in the 
Department of Defense’s ability to ensure major weapon systems are affordable. The 
DOD has placed increased emphasis on improving how it procures intellectual property 
and intellectual property rights, and in how it understands the complex issues behind 
intellectual property that exist between the DOD and industry. The research in this paper 
seeks to evaluate recent DOD efforts to improve the acquisition of intellectual property 
(specifically technical data and computer software) and intellectual property rights. 
Additionally, the research takes a look at past acquisitions to evaluate the intellectual 
property strategies developed during the acquisition planning and contract award phases 
of four Air Force major weapon system programs. The paper utilizes the research 
findings to identify “best practices” that can be readily applied to future acquisitions 
when procuring technical data and computer software rights. 
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Intellectual property and intellectual property rights are a critically important area 
of weapon system acquisitions. Acquisition of intellectual property gives the United States 
military access to emerging technology. Its role in weapon system procurement has started 
to percolate to a position of awareness over the past several years and major acquisitions. 
In his memorandum establishing the new cross-functional team (CFT) for intellectual 
property in Air Force acquisitions, Under Secretary of the Air Force Matthew Donovan 
opens by explaining “obtaining adequate intellectual property license rights from our 
industry partners is critical to ensuring our major weapon systems are affordable and 
adaptable to meet warfighter needs” (Intellectual Property Cross Functional Team, 2019). 
The judicious acquisition of intellectual property also helps increase long-run competition 
for major weapon systems and has the potential to reduce sustainment costs over the 
lifetime of expensive procurements. 
A. PURPOSE 
The Air Force maintains many older weapon systems past their intended lifespan, 
often referred to as legacy systems. While these legacy systems remain combat-effective, 
they have increasing maintenance costs as the systems age and components break down. 
Acquiring the intellectual property rights to legacy systems and future weapon systems can 
help keep life-cycle maintenance costs down. These costs are minimized by allowing the 
Air Force contracting officers in charge of life-cycle procurement to use more competition 
to solicit for parts and components that were previously locked into a single source by their 
proprietary nature, and therefore usually only available for sole-source acquisitions. 
In addition to keeping sustainment costs low, proper acquisition of intellectual 
property may serve to increase the adaptability of legacy weapon systems. Turning future 
competitions into an open-source environment by releasing a product’s intellectual 
property from proprietary vendor-lock allows more contractors to design, bid, and 
compete. Vendor-lock is a serious consideration when procuring data packages for weapon 
systems, especially when trying to promote increased future adaptability and decreased 
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sustainment costs (Pawlyk, 2018). Increased vendor numbers can lead to superior products 
to be adapted for any mission that the United States Air Force may require of their weapon 
systems. 
Access to emerging technologies is an integral factor in advancing the United States 
Air Force’s superiority over its adversaries. These rising technologies can often come from 
nontraditional defense contractors; that is, contractors that do not normally do business 
with the Department of Defense (DOD) or the Air Force but have products that the military 
may find useful. In many cases, these nontraditional defense contractors may be 
discouraged by the infamously long DOD acquisition and procurement processes. In other 
cases, however, nontraditional defense contractors avoid working with the Air Force and 
other military branches because they do not want to give up their intellectual property and 
the rights to their technical data.  
Another important factor when considering whether to pursue the procurement of 
intellectual property and technical data rights is the effect that these rights have on 
competition. Putting acquisitions that normally end up being sole-source into a fully 
competitive environment may have the long-term effect of driving life-cycle operations 
and support costs down. This factor will have to be weighed against the upfront contracting 
costs for the Air Force to take ownership of any intellectual property and technical data 
rights for new procurements or aging legacy systems.  
Expanding the Air Force’s procurement of intellectual property and technical data 
rights may also allow for the inclusion of more small businesses in Air Force contracting. 
Lack of participation from small businesses in Air Force procurement is a perennial issue, 
and the small business procurement goals that the Air Force sets are mostly carried by 
smaller contracting offices with smaller budgets. Leveraging the massive amount of 
spending that a life-cycle management center, a system program office, or any of the other 
large Air Force contracting offices against the cost of acquiring intellectual property could 
help take the pressure off smaller offices throughout the Air Force.  
As alluded to when discussing competition, the acquisition of intellectual property 
and technical data rights has the strong potential to keep life-cycle sustainment costs down 
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through competing contracting actions for maintenance work and replacement parts. In 
recent years, the replacement parts for Air Force weapon systems have made the news with 
their shockingly expensive price tags (Pawlyk, 2018). These increased price tags come 
from long-held contracts that keep the parts in a sole-source environment, excluding other 
vendors for competing on components contracts for the Air Force.  
As it stands right now, intellectual property and technical data rights are an 
important part of Air Force procurement strategies, yet this is one of the more poorly 
understood areas of procurement. There is no standardized way for the procuring 
contracting officer to procure intellectual property or technical data rights, making each 
contract a one-off event. In some cases, the Air Force is using Section H of their contracts 
to procure those data rights, but they often ask for a level of ownership over the intellectual 
property or technical data rights that is unnecessary or even inappropriate (DeVecchio, 
2018).  
Recognizing this as an issue, the Air Force established the Intellectual Property 
Center of Excellence (IP CoE), which seeks to clarify and guide Air Force contracting 
officers in the procurement of intellectual property, including technical data rights. The IP 
CoE provides education and training to the Air Force on intellectual property procurement, 
which can be a significant force multiplier, making acquisition more effective. The 
Intellectual Property Center of Excellence is, however, only a single office, and the task of 
educating the Air Force acquisition corps is challenging. 
Not only is the Air Force struggling with their own understanding of intellectual 
property and data rights in acquisitions, but the vendors that the Air Force works with are 
far savvier than the military. Past acquisitions have relied on questionable clauses and 
dubious interpretations for Air Force acquisitions personnel to gain access to and 
ownership over intellectual property and data rights (DeVecchio, 2018). Now, some 
vendors are pushing back and threatening protest over the misuse of certain federal statutes, 
while encouraging others to do the same (DeVecchio, 2018). If the Air Force cannot 
perform these acquisitions properly, there may be negative consequences for the Air Force 
and the taxpayer dollars entrusted to them. 
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The lack of understanding extends beyond the legal intricacies and into the actual 
technical needs of the Air Force. According to Major General Cameron Holt during a 
conversation with Naval Postgraduate School students at the 2019 Acquisition Research 
Symposium, there were many times in his career in which the Air Force asked for more 
access to intellectual property and technical data rights than was truly needed for the 
program in question (Holt, 2019). What was most telling about these exchanges is that the 
vendors knew far more about what was required than the Air Force acquisition team they 
were engaging with and that the Air Force acquisition team was defaulting to demand 
almost every piece of intellectual property.  
General Holt went further to elaborate on the need for providing Air Force 
contracting guidance on how to set up contract clauses, specifically using Section H of the 
Uniform Contract Format, to come up with mutually agreeable clauses for intellectual 
property and technical data rights acquisitions (Holt, 2019). Currently, the clauses being 
used are all tailored specifically to individual contracts, which is a necessity with such 
highly specialized contract content. There must be, however, many similar characteristics 
across the clauses in Section H of these contracts and the Air Force could capitalize by 
streamlining clauses to most closely match what is required, and what is most mutually 
beneficial to the Air Force and the contractors.  
It has been made abundantly clear that the Air Force needs to better understand the 
intricacies of intellectual property and technical data rights in acquisitions if the Air Force 
is to stay ahead of their competitors. Competing nations may not have to abide by the same 
level of regulation that an Air Force contracting officer has to abide by. These countries 
may even require the wholesale surrender of data rights to the purchasing nation. 
Sometimes military materiel in competitor nations is purchased through state-run industries 
unlike the defense industrial complex of the United States. Despite these handicaps, the 
necessary technical data rights and intellectual property can be acquired within the 
guidelines of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. 
Understanding which rights are required and when they are required are key to 
having a successful program. Unfortunately, the Air Force lags behind its industry partners 
in this understanding and often asks for levels of access that are unnecessary and 
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inappropriate for the health of the program. Our thesis outlines several identifying factors 
that indicate when technical data rights and intellectual property need to be procured. This 
work also shows the level of ownership that the Air Force truly needs to be successful when 
it is deemed appropriate to acquire intellectual property and technical data rights from a 
vendor.  
The issue of intellectual property in procurement is not solely a problem within the 
United States Air Force. Rather, this issue extends across the DOD into all the branches of 
military service (Thornberry, 2019). Funding for other programs is threatened if the DOD 
does not make significant progress in the establishment of an intellectual property policy 
and a knowledgeable workforce (Thornberry, 2019). The attention of Congress toward the 
issue of intellectual property in military procurement highlights just how important this 
issue has become in an era of increasingly tight budgets and elevated scrutiny. 
The attention from the United States Congress extends into the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2019. This act, named after late Senator John S. McCain, a veteran 
United States Navy aviator and long-time lawmaker, outlines the specifics of how the 
United States Congress authorizes the United States military to obligate money for fiscal 
year 2019. Within the National Defense Authorization Act, there are nine references to the 
procurement of intellectual property (John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2019, 2018). Many of those references are specific directions to consider 
the impact of procuring intellectual property in new systems (John S. McCain National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, 2018).  
The direction from Congress extends from the acquisition of software development 
and applications to quantum sciences, and also extends protections for the original 
developers of the intellectual property and technical data rights (John S. McCain National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, 2018). This indicates that Congress has 
recognized that the procurement of intellectual property is very important to the DOD but 
has also realized the importance that these intellectual properties and technical data rights 
hold for the software developers, programmers, and engineers who are working hard on 
their products and that they deserve to have their rights protected.  
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Congress clearly does not want the United States military to go overboard on the 
procurement of technical data rights, especially with regard to agile software development, 
directing the DOD to evaluate “how intellectual property ownership issues associated with 
software applications developed with Agile DevOps processes will be addressed to ensure 
future sustainment, maintenance, and upgrades to software applications after the 
applications are fielded” (John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2019, 2018). This reminds us that the procurement of intellectual property may not 
be the appropriate action in each case, and that every procurement is substantially different 
from other procurements and needs to have careful consideration given to the procurement 
of intellectual property and technical data rights for each applicable acquisition.  
The direction to consider intellectual property in the procurement of future systems 
can also be extrapolated to be a direction to consider the procurement of technical data 
rights and intellectual property for legacy systems as well as new systems in the 
procurement pipeline, especially in the realm of maintenance and replacement parts. 
Clearly, this is an important issue for the United States Congress, which means that it 
deserves scrutiny, effort, and understanding from the United States military and acquisition 
professionals. 
B. PROBLEM 
Our primary research question stemmed from a conversation held with Major 
General Cameron Holt, the deputy assistant secretary for contracting, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (Holt, 
2018). Major General Holt mentioned that, throughout his career as an Air Force 
Contracting Officer, there had often been disputes on what intellectual property and 
technical data rights promoted successful programs. The definition of “healthy” varies 
from procurement to procurement. Some procurements may require rapidly adaptable, 
open-source hardware and software while others may be more focused on schedules, 
budgets, or other more traditional acquisition focuses (Holt, 2019). From this conversation 
we seek to answer the question: Is the United Systems Air Force sufficiently addressing 
intellectual property in acquisition planning for major weapon systems? Another question 
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from that primary question is: What level of intellectual property is appropriate to acquire 
in United States Air Force acquisitions? There is clearly a level of ownership that is 
appropriate, and that level likely varies from one acquisition to the next.  
Further consideration of our primary question brings about a secondary question 
that relates to the contract clauses being used to acquire these data rights and intellectual 
property. What contract clauses are contracting officers using to acquire intellectual 
property and data rights? We hypothesize that there is not a standardized set of clauses 
being used by each procuring contracting officer, and that each clause is tailored to each 
individual contract. An additional research question is: What characteristics are shared 
between the custom clauses being used?  
Following our question about contract clauses, we wanted to know how the Air 
Force defines operation, maintenance, installation, and training (OMIT) data within 
contracts and does industry have issues with this definition? There has not been a 
standardized definition in the DFARS for OMIT Data (Intellectual Property Cross 
Functional Team, 2019), and this has led to considerable friction between government 
acquisition teams and industry partners (DeVecchio, 2018). 
Our final research question, what are the main factors that contribute to issues 
between the Air Force and contractors in successfully negotiating intellectual property 
rights, seeks to investigate how the Air Force determines what rights are necessary to 
acquire. This question focuses mostly on the pre-award phase of the contract and how the 
knowledge gap between the Air Force and industry drives government-vendor interactions.  
Research Questions: 
1. Is the United States Air Force sufficiently addressing intellectual 
property in the acquisition planning of major weapon systems? 
 
2. What contract clauses are contracting officers using to acquire 
intellectual property and data rights?  
 
3. How does the Air Force ensure adequate deliverables and license rights 




4. What are the main factors that create friction between the Air Force and 
contractors when negotiating intellectual property rights? 
C. METHOD 
Using data provided through the Air Force’s newly formed Intellectual Property 
Cross Functional Team (Intellectual Property Cross Functional Team, 2019) and Air Force 
Life Cycle Management Center Project Management Offices (PMOs), we looked at several 
major weapon systems and how many of them procured technical data packages, either as 
part of the solicitation, or as a part of a change order to the larger contract. After procuring 
this data, we investigated how those systems handled the exchange of intellectual property 
and the rights to the technical data, and how those exchanges evolved over time. 
D. SCOPE 
The chapter following the introduction provides a background on the status of 
intellectual property in Air Force contracting. Following our background information, we 
discuss the literature used in researching this thesis. Next, we discuss our results, and 
finally we provide a summary of our findings, along with some questions for potential 
further research. 
E. SUMMARY 
Acquiring ownership over intellectual property has the potential to drive Air Force 
procurement costs down for both legacy systems and for next generation systems making 
their way through the Air Force procurement system. These costs are driven down by 
expanding the level of competition for maintenance actions and spare parts for systems. 
There will likely be, however, some significant up-front resistance by vendors who are 
rightfully guarding their intellectual property and the technical data that make up their 
products. The Air Force must weigh when the up-front costs of procuring the intellectual 
property and technical data rights outweigh the long-term life-cycle costs of maintaining 
the system, and whether it will be worth the investment in the long run.  
Access to emerging technology will shape the way that the Air Force operates in 
the future. With adversaries rapidly closing the technology gap (Radin et al., 2019) that the 
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United States military has enjoyed for the past several decades, the procurement of new 
technologies must become a major part of United States military procurement programs. 
These emerging technologies include intellectual property, and the Air Force needs to 
understand how procuring ownership over the technical data and intellectual property of 
these technologies affects the cost of ownership of new systems. 
The thorough understanding of emerging technologies also requires a thorough 
understanding of how intellectual property and technology procurement are intermingled. 
With increasingly tech-savvy adversaries, the United States and her Air Force need to 
rapidly come to an understanding on how to cooperatively procure technical data rights 
from its industry partners. Some vendors are very averse to the military gaining access to 
their technology, especially if the military takes full ownership over it. Negotiating with 
those vendors who may have innovative technologies is an important part of advancing the 
level of technology available to the American warfighter.  
According to General Holt, there is scarcely another area of United States Air Force 
procurement that is as misunderstood than the procurement of intellectual property and 
technical data rights (Holt, 2019). The inception of government cadres to specifically 
address intellectual property indicates that this area of procurement is not fully understood. 
Though the Air Force has made incremental strides in expanding the understanding of 
intellectual property and technical data rights in procurement, there is a long way to go. 
Our research expands the knowledge base and furthers the understanding of the intricacies 
of how the Air Force has procured intellectual property in the past, recommends ways to 
improve intellectual property procurement considerations in future acquisition efforts.   
10 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This background discusses the Defense Acquisition System and the role that 
intellectual property plays in the process to acquire, sustain, and modernize weapon 
systems and materiel solutions necessary to equip the warfighter with the capabilities to 
execute the DOD mission. Underlying modern weapon systems is the technology and the 
intellectual property that is created from incorporating advanced technology into weapon 
systems. The procurement strategy for acquiring the intellectual property and license rights 
is just as critical a program consideration as any to the long-term sustainment and 
modernization of the weapon system. By statutory requirement, the Defense Acquisition 
System provides for the intellectual property strategy to assess program needs for 
intellectual property and license rights in an effort for program management to increase 
competition, program affordability, and lower sustainment costs of the program over the 
product life cycle (Department of Defense [DOD], 2017).  
A. DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM 
The Defense Acquisition System is the management mechanism acquisition 
professionals utilize to meet the capability requirements of the warfighter and to manage 
investments in technology, weapons systems, and product support. Department of Defense 
Directive (DODD) 5000.01, Defense Acquisition System, and Department of Defense 
Instruction (DODI) 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, provide the 
governing management framework of policies and procedures that the acquisition 
workforce must navigate in order to meet the needs of the warfighter. The defense 
acquisition system integrates requirements, acquisition, and the budgeting process in order 
to meet program objectives (DOD, 2017). Extensive knowledge and effective management 
of this complex process is necessary to establishing and executing a successful DOD 
program. As technology in society continues to advance, the incorporation of advanced 
technology into weapon systems will continue to grow, forcing programs to give 
considerable attention to intellectual property and how the intellectual property 
incorporated into the program is managed throughout the product life cycle. 
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DODI 5000.02 Operation of the Defense Acquisition System states,  
Program Managers for ACAT I and II programs, regardless of planned 
sustainment approach … shall assess the data required to design, 
manufacture, and sustain the system as well as to support re-competition for 
production, sustainment, or upgrades. DOD Guidance goes into more detail 
that analysis shall be completed to outline the open systems architecture 
approach, combined with technical data rights the government will pursue 
in order to ensure a lifetime consideration of competition in the acquisition 
of weapon systems. (Monsey, 2019)  
The importance of intellectual property within any acquisition is key in 
leveraging our buying power and allows for flexibility throughout any program 
to make sure our warfighters are getting what they need while spending 
appropriately.  
The FY2016–FY2018 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) include a 
number of acquisition reform initiatives addressing intellectual property for major weapon 
systems.. 
Rights to technical data developed in relation to government contracts have 
been a long-standing subject of debate between contractors and the 
government. The FY2016 NDAA set up an advisory panel to submit 
recommendations on amending regulations governing technical data in 
major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs). The FY2017 NDAA made 
a number of amendments to technical data rights, including giving DOD 
more authority to negotiate for data rights, and, in the case of interfaces 
developed exclusively at private expense, to require negotiations to 
determine the appropriate compensation for the technical data. The FY2018 
NDAA required the DOD to develop policy on the acquisition or licensing 
of intellectual property and establish a cadre of experts to assist in managing 
and acquiring intellectual property rights. (Schwartz & Peters, 2018, p. 5) 
Furthermore, the report goes into detail about defense acquisition 
programs. 
The FY2017 NDAA required MDAPs to be designed and developed using 
a modular open system architecture approach to enable incremental 
development and enhance competition, innovation, and interoperability. 
The open architecture requirements extend to major system interfaces and 
standards for use in major system platforms. The act also generally 
establishes the authority to conduct and establish funding for prototype 
projects when there is a high-priority warfighter need due to a capability 
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gap, there is an opportunity to integrate new components into a major 
weapon system based on commercial technology, the technology is 
expected to be mature enough to prototype within three years, and there is 
an opportunity to reduce sustainment costs. (Schwartz & Peters, 2018, p. 4) 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is the principal set of rules for 
government contracting within the DOD, while the Defense Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Supplement (DFARS) is the governing regulation on intellectual property. The 
FAR along with the DFARS guide contracting officers and all members of the acquisition 
team in acquisition planning, competition requirements, pre-award concerns, award 
procedures, and contract administration. 
B. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Intellectual property is the broad category that traditionally includes, “patents, 
copyrights, and trademarks” along with trade secrets (American Association of University 
Professors, 2016). “Owners of intellectual property are granted certain exclusive rights 
protected by law to control the use and dissemination of their intellectual property” (Nash 
& Rawicz, 2008). When discussing intellectual property in the acquisition of weapon 
systems, the IP of greatest interest is in technical data and computer software (Van Atta, 
Kneece, Lippitz, & Patterson, 2017).  
The intellectual property of a defense contractor is generally regarded as the 
livelihood of the company; therefore, companies seek to protect their intellectual property 
from competitors in order to maintain a competitive advantage and to protect large 
investments into research and development. In the past, the DOD led industry efforts in 
research and development into technology; however, today the reverse is true, where 
industry is now leading research and development spend into technology and has become 
the driving force for innovation in weapon systems (Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [OUSD(AT&L)], 2001).  
As a result of the change, the DOD has shifted from “initiator” to “early adopter” 
of new technology, where the DOD must look for ways to bring industry innovation to the 
DOD in order to capture the latest technologies and capabilities within its weapon systems. 
As an early adopter of innovation, the government does not own the intellectual property 
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created by a defense contractor, even under a contract completely funded by the 
government, except under certain circumstances. In practice, the government acquires a 
license from the defense contractor to use, reproduce, modify or share the data with outside 
sources in accordance with the level of license acquired from the defense contractor.  
The challenge, however, has been in establishing the appropriate level of the data 
rights the government believes is necessary in order to acquire, modernize, and sustain a 
weapon system in an affordable manner. This has resulted in an overreach at times by the 
government to seek data rights beyond what defense contractors are comfortable with 
releasing, resulting in companies opting not to contract with government for fear of release 
of their proprietary intellectual property to third parties. 
In the Defense Acquisition System, intellectual property strategy is a statutory 
requirement for programs to evaluate how intellectual property will be managed through 
the life cycle of the program. Although the government program manager is responsible 
for ensuring intellectual property requirements are assessed at the beginning of a program, 
the procuring contracting officer plays a significant role in negotiating the terms and 
conditions of the contract and must work with the program manager to ensure the contract 
contains the appropriate intellectual property clauses in order to protect the interest of both 
the government and the defense contractor.  
Recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) studies have shown that 
acquiring the appropriate level of data rights at initial contract award is one of the most 
cost-effective solutions for the government to reduce program costs (Monsey, 2019). 
Waiting until after initial contract award can significantly drive up the costs of intellectual 
property rights and can have significant negative program effects such as reduced 
competition, diminishing supplier sources for spare parts, and increased sustainment costs.  
As weapon system hardware and software continues to incorporate more advanced 
technology, understanding the complexities of intellectual property statutes and 
regulations, along with the effective protection and management of the intellectual 
property, has become more important than ever for both industry and the government. 
Before tackling the issues surrounding intellectual property rights, establishing a basic 
15 
understanding of the different categories of intellectual property and the license rights is 
important for acquisition professionals to possess in order to enter into meaningful 
discussions with defense contractors regarding these topics. Working toward increased 
education and training of these concepts across the acquisition workforce will be important 
to creating and implementing appropriate intellectual property strategies in various 
acquisition programs across the DOD acquisition workforce. 
C. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RELEVANCE TO DEFENSE 
ACQUISITION SYSTEM 
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 shows the offensive 
mindset needed for the management of intellectual property matters within the Department 
of Defense and how critical it is for better training and education within the acquisition 
workforce.  
The House bill contained a provision (sec. 813) that would create a small 
cadre of experts in intellectual property that would advise, assist, and 
provide resources to program offices as they develop their IP strategies and 
negotiate with industry. This provision would also establish a centralized 
Office of Intellectual Property within the Department of Defense to 
standardize the Department’s approach toward obtaining technical data, 
promulgate policy on IP, oversee the cadre of IP experts, and serve as a 
single point of contact for industry on IP matters. Finally, this provision 
would add IP positions to the acquisition workforce and would revise the 
training provided to the acquisition workforce on IP matters. (National 
Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2018, 2017)  
The DOD is seeking to address the acquisition missteps of the past when it comes to data 
requirements and technical rights. 
The F-35 program is an example of why intellectual property is a top priority 
because of the failures throughout the program. Air Force Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan, 
who runs the F-35 program, explained, “The lack of clear contractual language about 
ownership of technical data and software code has put the Pentagon in a bind and has 
limited the government’s options on how to maintain, upgrade, and manage the Pentagon’s 
largest weapons acquisition” (Monsey, 2019). Lt. Gen. Bogdan went into further detail 
discussing  concerns with government and industry partners  regarding the review of laws 
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and regulations pertaining to rights in technical data. He expressed, “what I’m experiencing 
is the classic example that if you don’t think about this upfront you’re dead in the water at 
the back end of this” (Monsey, 2019). The Air Force is playing catch-up now on every 
decision when it comes to intellectual property. He also stated, “We don’t train our program 
managers, contracting officers, or even our lawyers that advise us on what this monster  
is” (Monsey, 2019). 
The GAO completed a report on the F-35 program titled F-35 Sustainment, Need 
for Affordable Strategy, Greater Attention to Risks, and Improved Cost Estimates and 
found the same concerns as General Bogdan. The bottom line was that the GAO 
recommends, “to promote competition, address affordability, and inform its overarching 
sustainment strategy, develop a long-term intellectual property strategy to include, but not 
limited to, the identification of current levels of technical data rights ownership by federal 
government and all critical technical data needs and their associated costs” (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2014a). The GAO reported: 
According to current DOD acquisition policy, an Intellectual Property 
Strategy must be established and maintained for all defense acquisition 
programs in order to identify and manage the full spectrum of intellectual 
property and related issues, such as technical data, from the inception of the 
program and throughout the life cycle. The intellectual property strategy 
describes how program management will assess program needs for, and 
acquire competitively whenever possible, the intellectual property 
deliverables and associated license rights necessary for competitive and 
affordable acquisition and sustainment over the entire product life cycle. 
The intellectual property strategy is to be updated throughout the entire 
product life cycle, summarized in the Acquisition Strategy, and presented 
with the Life Cycle Sustainment Plan during the Operations and Support 
Phase. The intellectual property strategy is also to integrate, for all systems, 
the intellectual property planning elements required under Subpart 207.106 
(S-70) of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. (GAO, 
2014a) 
The GAO reports that DOD officials need to better asses and evaluate technical 
data rights, recommending the development of a plan that describes what technical data the 
government possesses, what license rights are needed, and an assessment of the costs to 
acquire the necessary technical data and license rights. Throughout the investigation, 
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multiple DOD officials acknowledged the importantance of intellectual property rights, but 
still struggled to develop effective IP strategies. The report finally states: 
Without a long-term intellectual property strategy, the program runs the risk 
of not being able to complete requirements for such things as spare parts. 
Unless technical data rights needs are considered up front, critical data and 
software may not be acquired, rendering them unavailable (or unaffordable) 
years later when seeking to maximize competition on a program during its 
sustainment phase. (GAO, 2014a) 
The relevance of intellectual property is critical for success in any major system 
and needs to be a priority from the start, with a focus for all members working on the 
acquisition strategy and intellectual property strategy addressing all future needs and 
concerns for the program. Figure 1 shows a high-level intellectual property strategy of 
long-term data needs and how the data will be used. 
 
Figure 1. High-level intellectual property strategy. Source: 
Intellectual Property Cross Functional Team (2019). 
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D. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IS TOP PRIORITY FOR THE AIR 
FORCE 
The background of how and why intellectual property is a top focus is obvious with 
all the research conducted within the Air Force and the GAO reports completed over the 
last couple of years, but the Air Force is getting serious about equipping, educating, and 
training the Air Force acquisition career fields with the tools necessary to compete with 
industry when it comes to intellectual property. The Air Force has seen issues with multiple 
programs, including the F-35, C-17, and F-22 due to not having a trained and educated 
workforce on intellectual property (GAO, 2006). SMART IP: Air Force Data Rights 
Guidebook is just one step to equip the workforce. Another step taken was the commission 
of a government-industry advisory panel to review regulations in technical data rights. The 
formation of the panel stems from congressional mandate:  
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 
2016 (Public Law 114-92), as amended in the FY2017 NDAA (Public Law 
114-328), directed the secretary of defense to establish a government-
industry advisory panel (the Panel) for the purpose of reviewing Sections 
2320 and 2321 of Title 10, United States Code (USC), regarding rights in 
technical data and the validation of proprietary data restrictions and the 
regulations implementing such sections, to ensure that such statutory and 
regulatory requirements are best structured to serve the interests of the 
taxpayers and the national defense. (DOD, 2018) 
We identified multiple findings in the Section 809 Panel regarding how technical 
data rights requirements affect the Air Force’s ability to acquire what is required.  
The Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition 
Regulations, aka the Section 809 Panel, was established by Congress in the 
FY 2016 NDAA. Since its inception in August 2016 to its conclusion in 
July 2019, the panel has published an Interim Report and three-volume 
Final Report, containing a total of 98 recommendations aimed at changing 
the overall structure and operations of defense acquisition both strategically 
and tactically. (Section 809 Panel, 2019) 
The results of the Section 809 Panel were issued in three report volumes. Volume 
3 from Report of the Advisory Panel on Streamlining and Codifying Acquisition 
Regulations stated the importance of focusing on intellectual property rights: 
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Acquisition of data rights as part of the weapon system development has 
changed in recent years. If a weapon system is to be sustained through a 
combination of commercial and organic support, access to intellectual 
property rights that allow component repair and, in some cases, competition 
to provide those capabilities is crucial. Appropriate planning, funding, and 
contracting for government acquisition of necessary IP is best accomplished 
up front, not as an afterthought. Requesting a complete data package might 
not be cost effective either. Instead, the government should consider 
obtaining to rights to those specific portions and for the specific purposes 
of the system it foresees acquiring in the future. (Section 809 Panel, 2018b, 
p. 49) 
The panels expressed tension points between the parties, the issues at hand, 
discussions had between the parties and finally recommendations going forward. In 
conclusion,  
Government and industry recognize that they have differing positions on 
certain intellectual property issues. However, they are united regarding the 
important contributions of both parties to ensure that our Nation’s warriors 
are equipped with state-of-the-art equipment to defend the nation. The DOD 
recognizes that private industry plays a vital role in ensuring that innovative 
technologies continue to be developed to support the ever-changing needs 
of the warfighter. Industry recognizes that the DOD must ensure that 
support of the warfighter is accomplished in a cost-effective way while 
protecting the interests of the taxpayer. (DOD, 2018, p. 7) 
As the Air Force continues to realize the importance of the issue with intellectual 
property, the acting secretary mentioned a plan to set up the “Smart IP Cadre” in October 
2019 and the Center of Excellence for Intellectual Property will support the acquisition 
workforce. The issue of figuring out how much intellectual property is required to procure 
and sustain weapon systems will continue to be a main focus for the Air Force and setting 
up centers for support is a great start. This shows how important intellectual property is to 
the future of contracting. The background of why and how important intellectual property 
is to the acquisition system is no longer the issue. Being able to learn from the failures of 
the past (especially in the pre-award stage with these new guidelines), intellectual property 
centers, GAO reports, and the acquisition plans of current programs, we will apply lessons 
learned and recommendations from the IP guidebook to analyze how the Air Force can 
continue to get better at understanding intellection property within large weapons systems. 
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III. POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND PROCESSES 
DOD policy toward intellectual property has shifted over the years as a result of 
changes in the level of funding committed to research and development (R&D) by the DOD 
in developing new technology for weapon systems. Data from the National Science 
Foundation shows the DOD’s share of R&D funding in the United States during the 1960s 
was as high as 67%, dropped below 47% during the 1980s, and continued to decline further 
to just 26% in 2000 (Brock, 2002). Since 2000, the level of R&D investment by private 
industry has continued to experience tremendous growth, while the level of R&D 
investment at the DOD has only seen a slight increase (Boroush, 2016). During the period 
of time when the DOD was leading investment into new areas of R&D, the DOD was 
driving the creation of new technology under defense contracts to which it virtually had 
unlimited rights in the new defense equipment and technology (Van Atta, Kneece, Lippitz, 
& Patterson, 2017). The shift from the Department of Defense to private industry as the 
leading investor in R&D means most new innovations today are coming from private 
industry, switching the government from the driver seat of innovation to a partner with 
industry in the co-development of technology, and in some cases, only a buyer who obtains 
limited rights to the use of the intellectual property of contractors. As a buyer, the DOD 
must be an attractive business partner in the eyes of private industry in order to acquire the 
best technologies and services available within industry. For private industry, the 
protection of proprietary intellectual property that fuels their business and creates a 
competitive advantage becomes a vital criterion to working with the government. In order 
for the government to meet new threats and increasing operational needs, the government 
must be able to successfully address intellectual property issues that arise between the 
government and contractors (Brock, 2002). Today, even as private industry leads 
investment into R&D, the Department of Defense policy seems to be shifting again as the 
DOD seeks to acquire greater rights in contractor technical data and computer software 
(Pages, 2013). The shifts in intellectual property policy create a significant challenge for 
the DOD and private industry in order to protect the interest of both parties, as contractors 
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seek to protect their intellectual property in conducting business and the Department of 
Defense seeks to acquire the best technologies and services private industry has to offer.   
A. STATUTORY AUTHORITIES 
Statutory authority establishes the foundation for contractor rights in the protection 
of intellectual property and the distribution of rights in intellectual property. It is important 
to understand the underlying authority that protect the works of authors and inventors from 
the unauthorized use by others (in terms of defense acquisition, this would be the DOD and 
third parties). Congressional authority to protect the writings and discoveries of authors 
and inventors is granted under the United States Constitution, Article 1, Section 8 (Van 
Atta, Kneece, Lippitz, & Patterson, 2017). Congress implements the statutory authority 
that governs the rights between the Department of Defense, contractors, and subcontractors 
in technical data in 10 U.S.C. 2320—Rights in Technical Data. As the Department of 
Defense conducts business with private industry, 10 U.S.C. 2320 governs the allocation of 
data rights between the parties related to all technical data used in the performance of the 
contract. In determining the allocation of data rights, the statute generally provides a 
determination of rights based on a funding used to develop items, components, and 
processes. The three categories of development based on funding include developed 
exclusively with federal funding, developed exclusively with private funding, and 
developed with mixed (government and private) funding (10 U.S.C., § 2320). 
The statute also provides four exceptions to the category of exclusively privately 
funded developments in which the contractor cannot place restrictions or limit the use of 
the government. The exceptions generally result in the government receiving unlimited 
license rights in data necessary for operation, maintenance, installation, and training 
(OMIT), related to the form, fit, and function (FFF) data that is publicly available or has 
previously released without restriction by the contractor or subcontractor, and data that 
constitutes a correction or change to data furnished by the government (10 U.S.C., § 2320). 
The regulatory treatment under the DFARS for the two categories of data, OMIT and FFF, 
are discussed later in this chapter.  
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B. TECHNICAL DATA AND COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
The acquisition of technical data and computer software has become increasingly 
important to the Department of Defense as it aims to control the costs of programs and to 
maintain flexibility in the acquisition and sustainment of weapon systems (GAO, 2011). 
Current policy in the DFARS separates technical data and computer software based on the 
statutory definition of technical data. The statute 10 U.S.C. 2302 defines technical data as  
recorded information (regardless of the form or method of the recording) of 
a scientific or technical nature (including computer software 
documentation) relating to supplies procured by an agency. Such term does 
not include computer software or financial, administrative, cost or pricing, 
or management data or other information incidental to contract 
administration.  
Understanding that the definition of technical data does not include computer software 
makes it clear the resulting reason for separate DFARS subparts in order to address rights 
in technical data and computer software. The tension points that the statutory definition of 
technical data create between the government and industry are addressed later in this 
chapter. 
C. FAR AND DFARS 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is the codified policies, procedures, and 
guidance that federal government agencies and contractors seeking to do business with 
federal government agencies follow in the conduct of business when utilizing 
Congressionally appropriated funds. The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS) is the applicable supplemental regulation to the FAR that imposes 
additional rules, regulations, and guidance that is to be utilized when conducting business 
with Department of Defense agencies.  
According to FAR 27.400, Department of Defense agencies are not to apply the 
FAR regulation at FAR 27.4, Rights in Data and Copyrights, and are instead, according to 
DFARS 227.400, to apply the policy at DFARS 227.71, Rights in Technical Data, and 
DFARS 227.72, Rights in Computer Software and Computer Software Documentation, to 
determine the allocation of data rights in technical data and computer software.  
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D. FAR POLICY AND CLAUSES 
As mentioned in the above section, DFARS policy and the applicable clauses 
related to rights in technical data and computer software are to be utilized instead of FAR 
policy and clauses when conducting business with a Department of Defense agency. When 
conducting business with civilian agency, FAR 52.227-14, Rights in Data—General, is the 
applicable clause utilized to determine rights in technical data and computer software.  
E. DFARS POLICY AND CLAUSES 
The policies and procedures related to the Department of Defense acquisition of 
data, rights in technical data, and computer software are located in DFARS 227.71, Rights 
in Technical Data, and DFARS 227.72, Rights in Computer Software and Computer 
Software Documentation. The following policy review covers the current policy within and 
related to DFARS 227.71 and DFARS 227.72 for the acquisition of technical data and 
computer software, respectively. 
The implementation of separate DFARS regulatory policy for technical data and 
computer software stems from the definition of technical data, as defined both in statute 
and regulation which states that technical data does not include computer software. With 
the distinction between technical data and computer software understood, two main 
DFARS clauses contractually govern the allocation of rights in technical data and computer 
software between the government and contractor in the acquisition of noncommercial 
items, DFARS 252.227-7013, Rights in Technical Data—Noncommercial Items, and 
DFARS 252.227-7014, Rights in Noncommercial Computer Software and Computer 
Software Documentation.  
1. Ownership vs. Data License Rights 
An important point of understanding when dealing with technical data and 
computer software is to distinguish between ownership in the technical data and license 
rights granted by the owner of the data to utilize the technical data. In DOD acquisition, 
this means the contractor is typically the owner of the technical data and computer 
software, and the government simply acquires and is granted a license by the contractor to 
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use the technical data in a specified manner under the law. Therefore, it does not matter if 
the contractor paid for the development or the government paid for it, the government 
receives license rights and the DFARS clauses do not grant the government with ownership 
or title (DeVecchio, 2018). 
DFARS policy states,  
The government obtains rights in technical data, including a copyright 
license, under an irrevocable license granted or obtained for the government 
by the contractor. The contractor or licensor retains all rights in the data not 
granted to the government. For technical data that pertain to items, 
components, or processes, the scope of the license is generally determined 
by the source of funds used to develop the item, component, or process. 
When the technical data do not pertain to items, components, or processes, 
the scope of the license is determined by the source of funds used to create 
the data. (DFARS 227.7103-4) 
The language of the DFARS clause clearly describes the government’s right to only 
a license in the technical data, which the scope of the license to be determined based on 
analysis of the source of funds used to develop the item, component of process. 
2. Commercial vs. Noncommercial 
The DFARS describes the standard types of license rights the government receives 
from the contractor in technical data to include unlimited rights, government purpose rights 
and limited rights, and the government and contractor can choose to utilize a non-standard 
clause to negotiate specifically negotiated rights (DFARS 227.7103-4). The type of license 
rights the government obtains from the contractor in the technical data translates directly 
to the limits of the government’s ability to use the technical data for future purposes. This 
is important to DOD weapon system programs because DOD programs have to consider in 
acquisition planning the ways in which the technical data will be utilized in the future for 
operation, sustainment, modernization, and upgrade of weapon systems.  
The categories of license rights in computer software vary only slightly to include 
unlimited rights, government purpose rights, restricted rights, and specifically negotiated 
rights (DFARS 227.7203-5). Table 1 describes the license categories available in technical 
data and computer software (both commercial and noncommercial): 
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Table 1. Data license rights categories. Adapted from 










Right to use and disclose 
the data publicly, in any 
manner and for any 
purpose and to permit 
others to do so.  
 
Noncommercial TD and 
CS.  
 
Includes data created 
exclusively with 
government funds and 
certain types of data 
regardless of funding 
source, such as OMIT 
and FFF data.  







Right to use or disclose 
within the government 
without restriction or 
disclose to third parties 
for government purposes 
only. Third parties cannot 
use the data for 
commercial purposes.  
Noncommercial TD and 
CS.  
 
Includes data developed 
with a mix of 
government and private 
fund  
 





Right to use or disclose 
data internally. No 
disclosure to third parties 
without written 
permission except under 





Includes data pertaining 
to items, components, or 
processes developed at 
private expense.  




Right to use data for 
specifically negotiated 
purposes. Other rights 
may be tailored as 
needed and negotiated.  
Noncommercial CS. 
Includes software 
developed at exclusively 
at private expense.  
Only one license 
to be utilized on 






Right to use data for 
specifically negotiated 
purposes. Rights may be 
tailored as needed. 
Any TD and CS.  
















Right to use commercial 
technical data. 
TD related to 
commercial products 
Limited rights in 
all TD, except UR 





Right to use commercial 
software and commercial 
software documentation. 




provided to public.  
 
3. Commercial vs. Noncommercial 
The DFARS provides an additional distinction in determining the rights of the DOD 
and contractor in technical data and computer software based on whether an item, 
component, or process to be delivered is commercial or noncommercial. The assessment 
of an item, component, or process as commercial or noncommercial is important and often 
contentious between the DOD and contractor due to the fact that different rights are then 
attributed to the item, component, or process if it is commercial or noncommercial. The 
DFARS states that the DOD shall only seek to acquire the technical data customarily 
provided to the public for commercial items. The DFARS also states the DOD is only to 
acquire the technical data and the rights to the technical data necessary to satisfy agency 
needs. The level of rights available to the DOD is significantly reduced if an item, 
component, or process (ICP) is commercial, therefore the determination of each ICP 
becomes an important step that requires due diligence by both the contractor and the DOD 
to ensure the appropriate rights of both parties. Dayn Beam (2009) argues that in assessing 
each ICP, the determination should be made at the lowest severable level to determine if 
each ICP is commercial or noncommercial. Beam (2009) also states,  
Even if the method of procuring implies a “commercial” status for the end 
item being acquired, the data rights allocation is most often made at the 
lowest severable level of the end item being procured. An overall 
classification of the end item as “commercial” would in no way determine 
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the status of each severable ICP. Therefore, the contract definitions of 
commercial must be applied to each severable ICP under discussion. (p. 20) 
The distinction in policy for commercial and noncommercial items makes the 
determination important for the DOD to ensure it gets enough data and rights in the data to 
meet mission requirements, while balancing the contractor’s rights to protect its technical 
data. 
4. OMIT and FFF Data 
Data relating to OMIT and FFF are two exceptions granted under the DFARS 
clauses related to the level of rights received by the government despite who paid for the 
development of the data and if the item, component or process if commercial. Based on the 
DFARS regulation, the government receives unlimited rights in the use of the technical 
data and computer software.  
5. Asserting, Marking, and Documenting Rights 
A third DFARS provision, and perhaps the most critical aspect to ensuring the 
proper allocation of data rights between the government and contractor, is DFARS 
252.227-7017, Identification and Assertion of Use, Release, or Disclosure Restriction. 
DFARS 252.227-7017 describes the pre-award process the contractor must follow in order 
to assert rights in noncommercial technical data and software to be delivered to government 
with other than unlimited rights. Contractors failing to properly adhere the process 
identified under DFARS 252.227-7017 have shown numerous examples of contractors 
giving up rights in technical data and software to the Department of Defense.  
The process identified under the provision at DFARS 252.227-7017 for identifying, 
asserting, and marking rights to be assessed with less than unlimited rights to the 
Department of Defense is a critical step for both the contractor and the government to 
ensure the appropriate rights are granted to both parties based on the specific details of 
each acquisition. Beam (2009) provides a detailed analysis of the assertion, marking, and 
documenting process, noting the assertion process identifies ICPs that will be used in the 
performance of the contract in which the contractor asserts less than unlimited rights to the 
government based on funding use in development of the ICP. DFARS 252.227-7017 
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provides an attachment for the contractor to identify and assert restrictions on the 
government’s use, release, or disclosure of technical data or computer software. 
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IV. GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY 
Successful major weapon system programs and relationships between industry and 
the Department of Defense rely on the ability of the acquisition and contracting process to 
meet the objectives of both industry and the Department of Defense. Increasingly, but now 
more than ever, it seems that intellectual property has become an important issue affecting 
how industry and the DOD structure their business relationship. Intellectual property is 
widely considered to be the “lifeblood” of industry contractors, which creates unique 
competitive advantages for contractors in promoting and conducting business in both the 
public and commercial sector. Therefore, contractors seek to protect their intellectual 
property, and are often at first very reluctant to share this proprietary information with 
Department of Defense customers (Nash & Rawicz, 2008). Across the DOD, agencies have 
begun to recognize the importance of intellectual property in creating successful programs 
and sustaining major weapon systems long term. The Office of the Staff Judge Advocate 
of the Space and Missile Center (2015) noted the importance of intellectual property to the 
DOD stating, 
In a similar fashion, the Department of Defense (DOD) considers a certain 
type of IP—technical data and computer software rights acquired under its 
contracts—its “lifeblood” in order to enhance competition and sustain each 
system and its subsystems over their life cycle (e.g., development, 
production, testing, installation, operation, maintenance, upgrades/
modifications, interoperability with other systems, transfer of technologies 
to other programs/systems/ platforms). (p. i) 
As national security objectives change to address the threats of an increasingly 
more globally competitive environment, the DOD must adapt its business practices to 
attract innovation and investment from industry in order to develop and acquire superior 
weapon systems that allow the DOD to maintain a competitive advantage over near-peer 
and future adversaries. It is critical to attract investment and innovation from established 
defense industrial base contractors. However, while it is now more essential than ever to 
attract new industry contractors to partner with the government, there is also a need to 
strike the appropriate balance of protecting the intellectual property of industry while also 
promoting the appropriate level of rights in the intellectual property that allows the DOD 
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to utilize the intellectual property to effectively and efficiently modernize and sustain 
weapon systems. The following section will assess the Air Force and contractor 
perspectives and each side’s key concerns regarding technical data and computer software 
and the various approaches that are being pursued to resolve the issues.  
A. CONGRESSIONAL POLICY EFFORTS 
Congress has placed increased emphasis in addressing rights in technical data in 
major weapons systems since 1984, when it enacted statutory codes 10 U.S.C 2320 and 10 
U.S.C. 2321 applicable to the Department of Defense, setting the stage for the Department 
of Defense to implement rights in technical data regulation in DFARS 227.71 (Nash & 
Rawicz, 2008). Congress adopted separate rights in technical data and computer software 
with changes to the DFARS in 1995, which, prior to the change, were both handled under 
rights in technical data (Nash & Rawicz, 2008). The Department of Defense now regulates 
rights in computer software under DFARS 227.72 Rights in Computer Software and 
Computer Software Documentation. More recently, the wave of policy change efforts in 
intellectual property launched from the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2007 which included a requirement for program managers of major weapon systems to 
evaluate the long-term technical-data needs of the weapon system (GAO, 2011). The 
Congressional direction required DOD programs to address weapon system life cycle 
requirements for technical data in the acquisition strategies of major weapon systems. 
DFARS 207.106 now requires acquisition planning for major weapon systems to address  
the long-term technical data and computer software needs of the system, to include the 
development of acquisition strategies that obtain the necessary deliverables with the 
appropriate level of license rights needed to sustain systems across the entire acquisition 
life cycle.  
Congress has continued to address intellectual property issues through subsequent 
NDAAs to date. The FY2016 NDAA introduced a number of significant efforts directed at 
addressing intellectual property rights; Section 809 established an independent advisory 
panel to review streamlining and codifying acquisition regulations, Section 813 directed 
the secretary of defense to establish a government-industry advisory panel on technical 
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data rights, and Section 875 mandated a Federally Funded Research and Development 
Center (FFRDC) study of DOD policies and practices associated with intellectual property 
rights relevant to weapon systems.  
The FY2017 NDAA introduced several changes to technical data rights, including 
granting more authority to the DOD to negotiate data rights. With regard to rights for 
interfaces, for interfaces developed completely at private expense, the NDAA required 
negotiations to be conducted to acquire the technical data (Schwartz & Peters, 2018). 
The FY2018 NDAA directed the DOD to develop acquisition policy for acquiring 
intellectual property and license rights to intellectual property, and required the DOD to 
establish a cadre of experts to assist the DOD services with acquiring intellectual property 
(Schwartz & Peters, 2018). In 2019, the Air Force established the Smart IP Cadre as a cadre 
of experts that include lawyers, engineers, contracting, program management, and 
logisticians personnel with the mission to improve the acquisition of intellectual property 
in the Air Force.  
The FY2019 NDAA continues to make strides in technical data and computer 
software through updating policy to require the DOD, to the maximum extent practicable, 
to negotiate a price for technical data before selecting a contractor for the Engineering, 
Manufacturing, and Development (EMD) phase, production of a weapon system, or the 
sustainment of major weapon system. Additionally, § 870 implements a requirement for 
the secretary of defense, “to report on the feasibility of and advisability of requiring access 
to digital technical data in all future acquisitions by the Department of Defense of combat, 
combat service, and combat support systems, including front-end negotiations for such 
access” (John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, 2018).  
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY EFFORTS 
The DOD’s efforts to improve the acquisition of intellectual property is part of the 
greater effort to meet the objectives of the DOD mission. The Defense Acquisition System 
provides the management process by which defense acquisition personnel acquire major 
weapon systems. 
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The Defense Acquisition System exists to manage the nation’s investments 
in technologies, programs, and product support necessary to achieve the 
National Security Strategy and support the United States Armed Forces. 
(DOD, 2003) 
The primary objective of Defense acquisition is to acquire quality products 
that satisfy user needs with measurable improvements to mission capability 
and operational support, in a timely manner, and at a fair and reasonable 
price. (DOD, 2003) 
In addition, the FAR system provides overarching guiding principles toward which 
federal acquisition system is intended to deliver (FAR 1.102 (b)) 
(1) Satisfy the customer in terms of cost, quality, and timeliness of 
the delivered product or service by, for example- 
(i) Maximizing the use of commercial products and services; 
(ii) Using contractors who have a track record of successful past 
performance or who demonstrate a current superior ability to 
perform; and 
(iii) Promoting competition.  
Effective acquisition of intellectual property plays a significant role in the ability 
of the DOD to meet the objectives of the FAR and Defense Acquisition System, especially 
in terms of cost, use of commercial products and services, and promoting competition.  
The Air Force has placed increasing efforts to improve intellectual property 
acquisition through establishment of an IP Cross Functional Team that looks at ways to 
improve knowledge within the Air Force on intellectual property rights and how the Air 
Force engages with industry to ensure the Air Force acquires the adequate rights to its 
major weapon systems. In 2018, the Under Secretary of the Air Force issued guidance to 
Air Force acquisition community stating 
Obtaining adequate intellectual property license rights form our industry 
partners is critical to ensuring our major systems are affordable…. When 
we do not secure appropriate rights in technical data and computer software, 
we become dependent on incumbent contractors for the operation, 
maintenance, training and sustainment of our major systems. (Donovan, 
2018) 
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The focus on intellectual property policy reform is driven from the top down, 
generated through Congressional policy changes, adopted and tailored into DOD policy, 
and finally executed within the executive branches of the military, such as the Air Force.  
C. GOVERNMENT VIEW ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
The government’s motivation to improve the acquisition of intellectual property in 
major weapon systems is driven toward meeting the objectives of the Defense Acquisition 
System, in order to acquire quality products (i.e., major weapon systems) at a fair and 
reasonable price. By improving the acquisition of intellectual property to ensure the 
government acquires the necessary intellectual property and license rights, the government 
can more effectively manage the long-term investments in major weapon systems. The 
DOD invests billions of dollars every year into new and existing (legacy) programs that 
are being managed in the acquisition life cycle from cradle to grave. Throughout the 
acquisition life cycle, intellectual property plays an important role for the government in 
meeting needs for design, manufacture, sustainment, organic support, third-party support, 
diagnostics, investigations, modernization, upgrades, subsystems, and replacing 
diminishing sources (Nash & Rawicz, 2018).  
While aiming to meet the goals of the Defense Acquisition System, the unique 
challenge to the government in acquiring major weapon systems is meeting additional 
policy requirements such as promoting competition, small business participation, use of 
commercial products, and modular open systems architecture.  
Additionally, statutory regulation (10 U.S.C. 2320) and DFARS regulation only 
support the government’s ability to acquire the minimum required technical data necessary 
to facilitate life cycle requirements (Kemp, Stutzriem, & Penney, 2018). Limiting the 
government’s ability to acquire more data than necessary creates friction between 
government and industry in determining where to draw the line on what data is necessary 
for the government to have. As mentioned by Secretary Donovan (2019), the government 
must seek to ensure weapon systems are affordable by ensuring the government obtains 
adequate rights to data produced in major weapon systems. The government still seeks to 
strike the appropriate balance with industry to secure rights in data and the type of data 
36 
necessary to meet the government’s objectives. The DOD faces a number of issues that 
further complicate the already complex issues in intellectual property. 
D. DOD ISSUES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
The DOD problems in intellectual property have centered around two basic issues: 
(1) how much technical information to obtain from contractors, and (2) what protection the 
government should afford to the technical information obtained (Nash & Rawicz, 2008).  
While all acquisitions are unique, the DOD encounters issues in several common 
areas that require increased consideration in order to improve how it acquires IP and is able 
to answers the two basic issues in intellectual property identified above. The DOD must 
give increased consideration to and seek to make improvements with respect to intellectual 
property in the areas of requirements determination and acquisition planning and OMIT 
data.  
1. Requirements Determination and Acquisition Planning 
The requirements definition process is utilized to describe DOD needs for supplies 
or services, and, as it relates to intellectual property, should describe the DOD’s needs in 
technical data and computer software and associated license rights. The acquisition 
planning process is aimed at producing a comprehensive and integrated plan to fulfill 
agency requirements in a timely manner and reasonable cost (FAR 2.101). The 
requirements determination process and the acquisition planning go hand-in-hand to 
ultimately ensure the needs of the warfighter are met while also meeting the objectives of 
the defense acquisition system. Adequate planning is necessary to ensure the agency 
appropriately addresses all necessary areas of the acquisition and reduces risk (in terms of 
cost, schedule, performance) to the government in obtaining the requirement.  
The general consensus across the DOD is the understanding that negotiation of 
intellectual property rights favors the government when competition is present in the 
acquisition process which for major systems occurs prior to the award of the EMD contract 
(Implementation Guidance for Army Directive 2018–26, 2019). This means the DOD’s 
ability to negotiate favorable intellectual property rights occurs mostly with new systems; 
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however, the DOD has a large number of legacy systems that are beyond the development 
phase. Legacy programs are in more unfavorable positions to negotiate IP rights without 
competition between contractors, therefore, legacy programs experience issues with 
“vendor lock” (Intellectual Property Cross Functional Team, 2019). 
Contributing to the DOD’s ability to adequately obtain the necessary data rights in 
major weapon systems is the inability of program offices to determine data requirements 
at the beginning of a program when the government enters into a contract for the 
development of a new weapon system. The inability to determine requirements early is 
significant. Findings from the GAO indicate that failing to adequately assess and obtain 
technical data and license rights early in the acquisition process of a program can create 
challenges for the DOD in sustaining weapon systems over their acquisition life cycle 
(GAO, 2006). Nash and Rawicz (2008) point out that from the government’s inability to 
definitively determine long term data requirements, a “fail-safe” strategy is generally taken 
to acquire large amounts of data in an attempt to cover all of the possible data needs during 
the life cycle of the system. Generally, a poorly defined requirement can lead to the 
government not obtaining all of the necessary technical data and computer software rights 
to sustain a system, or as in the case described by Nash and Rawicz (2008) translates to the 
government potentially paying more for technical data and computer software that it does 
not need or will not use. For example, as highlighted in the 2006 GAO Case 06–893 DOD 
Should Strengthen Policies for Assessing Technical Data Needs to Support Weapon 
Systems, the Air Force C-17 program did not adequately procure the necessary data rights 
upfront in the beginning of the program to develop a core maintenance capability 
requirement that was identified after development and during the operation and support 
phase of the program. As a result, the Air Force received pushback from subvendors 
regarding providing the necessary technical data rights that would allow the Air Force to 
develop the core capability of organic depot maintenance to support national emergencies 
(GAO, 2006). From this experience and other similar DOD program experiences cited in 
the GAO report, the GAO recommended the DOD create a requirement for programs to 
assess the long-term requirements for technical data rights and develop acquisition 
strategies that address those requirements. In 2007, the NDAA included the requirement 
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for program managers to address the long-term weapon system life-cycle requirements for 
technical data, and in response the DOD implemented policy that required acquisition 
strategies and acquisition plan documents to address the life-cycle technical data 
requirements for each program.  
The DOD 5000.02 describes the acquisition strategy as the program manager’s plan 
for program execution across the entire life cycle of a weapon system. The acquisition 
strategy is a comprehensive plan that develops strategies for important areas of the 
acquisition including business, technical, and support strategies to manage risk and meet 
program objectives (DOD, 2017). As part of the acquisition strategy, the intellectual 
property strategy is the program’s plan to address how the program will assess IP issues, 
including technical data and computer software, and the appropriate license rights from the 
beginning of the program across the entire life cycle (DODI, 2017). The Section 875 
Institute for Defense Analyses report provides a detailed analysis of the DODI 5000.02 
sustainment planning processes and notes the additional IP strategy uses in sustainment 
planning,  
As part of life cycle sustainment planning, program management develops 
a product support strategy, which as one of its minimum requirements 
includes “the necessary intellectual property (IP) deliverables and 
associated license rights, consistent with and integrated with the program 
IP Strategy.” To ensure the continued support of the system being acquired, 
the IP Strategy “becomes part of the Life-Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP) 
during Operations and Support (O&S).” The IP Strategy is a required annex 
of the LCSP and is to be “updated appropriately during the O&S Phase.” 
(Van Atta, Kneece, Lippitz, & Patterson, 2017, 22–23) 
The Air Force notes the importance of incorporating IP into the acquisition strategy 
documents, by stating that the process is vital to address needs for technical data and 
software and although the IP Strategy is only statutorily required for Acquisition Category 
(ACAT) I and II programs, all programs should assess IP requirements (Intellectual 
Property Cross Functional Team, 2019).  
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2. OMIT Data 
OMIT data is the unique category of data that is provided an exception for in 10 
U.S.C. 2320 Rights in Technical Data when considering allocation of rights in data. The 
statute provides that a contractor’s development of an item, component, or process 
exclusively at private expense, does not restrict the governments rights if the data is related 
to OMIT, not including data related to detailed manufacturing and process data (DMPD). 
To make the issue more complicated for industry and government to determine rights in 
data, acquisition regulation does not provide a definition for OMIT data or the specific 
types of data that are covered under OMIT data. Therefore, industry and the government 
have been left to debate the definition and negotiate rights in OMIT unique to each 
acquisition (See Chapter VI Data and Analysis for program examples). Van Atta, Kneece, 
Lippitz, & Patterson (2017) note in their report, “ambiguous terms and loosely defined 
constructs impair implementation of IP for sustainment.” The report cites the terms OMIT, 
DMPD, and depot maintenance as terms creating confusion among industry and 
government, with both sides having differences in interpretation.  
E. INDUSTRY/CONTRACTOR PERSPECTIVE 
When it comes to intellectual property, the DOD and contractors have significantly 
different interests, as contractors consider their intellectual property to be the “lifeblood” 
of their company that provides them a competitive advantage that they will only disclose 
for a premium (Office of the Staff Judge Advocate Space and Missile Systems Center, 
2015). Contractors who produce technologically oriented products usually have large 
amounts of technical information, which they consider to be proprietary and may be 
reluctant to disclose such information to the government (Nash & Rawicz, 2008). Nash and 
Rawicz (2008) additionally note that the interests of both the DOD and industry are covered 
in FAR 27.402(a) and FAR 27.402(b). FAR 27.402(b) states the DOD requires data in 
order for the DOD to run its programs and meet mission objectives, and that contractors 
have proprietary interests in the data that must be protected from unauthorized use and 
disclosure. Additionally, FAR 27.402(b) states the protection of contractor data is 
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necessary to promote industry participation in government contracting and to encourage 
contractors to utilize innovative solutions in government programs. 
1. Section 813 Panel Summary 
The 2016 NDAA Section 813, directed the secretary of defense to establish a 
government-industry panel that was charged to review the statutory language regarding 
rights in technical data includes in 10 U.SC 2320 and 2321. The government-industry panel 
reviewed the sections to ensure the structure promoted the interest of the taxpayer and 
national defense (Department of Defense, 2018). In the report, both government and 
industry representatives acknowledged that the DOD and industry have different 
motivations in their business models. The panel identified tension points of disagreement 
between industry and the government regarding intellectual property. A few of the tension 
points discussed during the panel included discussions regarding the business models of 
the government and industry,  contract data requirements lists (CDRLs), OMIT versus 
DMPD data, contract requirements in Section H, lack of trained personnel, and the burden 
of the data assertions list to the contractor and the government. The panel address the 
tension points in white papers that recommend changes to statutory language and changes 
that do not require statutory language change. In concluding the panel, the government and 
industry arrived at an important conclusion, recognizing the differing business models of 
each party, but understanding that the DOD and industry’s goal must remain focused on 
supporting the warfighter in a cost-effective way.  
2. OMIT Data—Contractor Perspective 
When it comes to OMIT data, as well as IP rights in general, industry generally 
agrees that the DOD overreaches when concluding data falls into the category of OMIT. 
Specifically, in reference to the Air Force’s use of Special H Clauses in contracts to define 
OMIT data, DeVecchio (2018) states, “They are contrary to law and to the balance 
Congress and DOD overall strive to maintain between the Government’s and contractors’ 
interests. They overreach, denigrating contractors’ legitimate and important rights in 
intellectual property.” He additional notes that the problem is largely due to the absence of 
definitions in statute, which leaves room for debate. The Section 813 Panel identified the 
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category of OMIT data as a tension point in the acquisition of intellectual property due to 
the lack of acquisition documents that define data deliverables which relate to OMIT data 
(Department of Defense, 2018). Contractor pushback toward OMIT data was brought to 
bear in a GAO protest by Sikorsky Corporation in the Air Force’s solicitation of the UH-
1N Helicopter Replacement Program (GAO, 2018). Sikorsky Corporation, as part of the 
grounds for protest, protested the Air Force’s use of a special H clause which described the 
delivery and license rights for technical data and computer software for OMIT data. The 
contractor asserted the special H clause required the delivery of OMIT data that included 
detailed manufacturing and production data (DMPD) in its definition of OMIT data. The 
GAO ultimately denied the protest, and Sikorsky lost the competition for the UH-1N 
helicopter replacement program, but the protest highlighted contractor and government 
issues that exist due to a lack of a clear definition of OMIT data.  
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V. METHODOLOGY 
This project explores the complex contracting situation revolving around the 
acquisition of intellectual property in DOD weapon systems. The main intellectual property 
concerns for the DOD deal with technical data and computer software and the rights 
associated with their use. DOD weapon systems rely heavily on the use of Operational, 
Maintenance, Installation, and Training (OMIT) data packages for long term sustainment. 
This reliance often leads to disagreements between contractors and government about what 
qualifies as OMIT data, and the place of OMIT clauses in Section H of pertinent DOD 
weapon system acquisitions (DeVecchio, 2018).  
Our research involves a combination of policy review, previous procurements in 
which intellectual property played a major role, GAO and third-party reports on the status 
of intellectual property procurement in the DOD, and new agency guidance that illuminates 
the way forward for future intellectual property procurements. Gathering opinions and data 
from both public and private sector parties, in both academic and professional capacities, 
helps show the disparity in interpretation of the OMIT clauses, regulations, and statutes.  
A. DATA COLLECTION 
We gathered procurement data from four ongoing, or recently awarded, United 
States Air Force (USAF) ACAT I programs: UH-1N Replacement, T-7A Advanced Pilot 
Trainer, Combat Rescue Helicopter, and KC-46 Pegasus Tanker. Program data for these 
procurements were provided by individuals within the contracting team for each program.  
To attack the policy surrounding intellectual property acquisition, we conducted a 
thorough analysis of applicable regulations coming from the FAR, DFARS, and 
DOD5000.2. Additionally, we dove into the rules pertaining to determining the allocation 
of data rights, including the steps involved to determine the government’s rights over data 
in weapon systems procurement.  
Using reports issued by the GAO and third parties such as RAND Corporation, we 
looked into the issues that have arisen over intellectual property, and the differences of 
interpretation by government and industry officials. These reports provided a window into 
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the major hurdles that face USAF acquisition personnel in future weapon system 
procurement. We also reviewed a recently issued policy guide, the Air Force Data Rights 
Guidebook issued by the Intellectual Property Cross Functional Team (2019), and 
compared its best practices to the actions taken by the four program offices in the 
procurement of the UH-1N Replacement, T-7A Advanced Pilot Trainer, Combat Rescue 
Helicopter, and KC-46 Pegasus Tanker.  
B. SUMMARY 
This study relies on multiple sources of data and analysis to assess the USAF’s 
efforts to define OMIT data with regard to future weapon system procurement. We utilized 
acquisitions statutes, regulations, and policies to determine how the USAF can stay within 
legal boundaries when it comes to protecting industry provided intellectual property, while 
still acquiring the necessary data to modernize and sustain weapon systems.  
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VI. DATA AND ANALYSIS 
Our data and analysis cover four different weapon system program offices. First, 
we conducted an analysis of the intellectual property strategy contained within the 
acquisition strategy and the life-cycle sustainment plan for the weapon systems. Next, we 
evaluated the similarities and differences between the specialized Section H clauses of the 
weapon system contracts. Finally, we homed in on the specific H clause that addressed 
OMIT data for the procurement. 
A. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY ANALYSIS  
Addressing the intellectual property needs of weapon systems must be a priority to 
achieve affordable acquisition and sustainment in all programs, and the DOD must 
sufficiently address intellectual property needs early in acquisition planning process within 
the IP strategy contained in the acquisition strategy (AS) and the life-cycle sustainment 
plan (LCSP). The IP strategy is a mandatory planning element included in the AS and 
becomes a required annex of the LCSP during the Operation and Sustainment Phase, 
however, since the LCSP is developed at Milestone A (Technology Maturation and Risk 
Reduction Phase), the IP strategy annex can be incorporated into the LCSP much earlier in 
the acquisition planning process (DOD, 2017). The IP strategy manages IP issues across 
the entire life cycle of the program and describes how the program will determine the 
requirements for IP and license rights necessary to promote competitive and affordable 
future sustainment in the program (DOD, 2017). Reviewing the AS in combination with 
the LCSP will provide insight into the level of assessment each program included in their 
respective IP strategies to plan for future competition in acquisition and affordable 
sustainment.  
Of the four programs we reviewed, we were unable to obtain the acquisition 
strategy and life-cycle sustainment plan of T-7A Advanced Pilot Trainer and the KC-46 
Pegasus Tanker. We analyzed the intellectual property strategy within the acquisition 
strategy and the life-cycle sustainment plan for the Combat Rescue Helicopter (CRH) 
completed in 2012 and UH-1N Replacement Program completed in 2017, while 
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considering new guidance provided in the Air Force Data Rights Guidebook to better equip 
acquisition personnel to handle IP issues (Intellectual Property Cross Functional Team, 
2019). The primary aim of the IP Guidebook, 
is intended to equip Air Force acquisition personnel to handle common 
issues encountered in the realm of intellectual property acquisition under 
the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, particularly those 
issues surrounding rights in technical data and computer 
software….Through action oriented plans, acquisition personnel are 
equipped to make informed decisions with the aim of improving acquisition 
outcomes (Intellectual Property Cross Functional Team, 2019, p. ii) 
We utilize the guidebook to compare the level of planning documented in the 
intellectual property strategy with best practices identified in the guidebook to assess where 
improvements to intellectual property strategy development can be made. The IP 
Guidebook emphasizes the importance of addressing program needs for technical data and 
computer software in acquisition planning, which ultimately comes together in the 
acquisition strategy. Therefore, the IP strategy must provide a thorough assessment of 
program needs for technical data and computer software and in-depth consideration by the 
program of the relevant issues that can impede the DOD’s ability to sustain the weapon 
system. The guidebook states, 
Acquiring the right technical data and computer software is essential for 
ensuring Air Force systems will remain affordable and sustainable. Thus, 
these needs should be addressed in the Acquisition Strategy, or more 
specifically, the IP Strategy. The IP Strategy covers almost every functional 
area within a Program Management Office (PMO), such as acquisition, 
financial, contracting, logistics, testing, and engineering, and it should 
contemplate the entire life cycle, not just the immediate requirements of the 
contract or PMO. (Intellectual Property Cross Functional Team, 2019, pp. 
1) 
A top-level view from the Guidebook advises on what information should be 
incorporated into the intellectual property strategy, along with how it should be integrated, 
and why the information needs to factor into the strategy. The Guidebook utilizes the DOD 
5000.02 to identify the required content of the IP strategy, and provides how to utilize the 
required contents to create an actionable plan. We utilize the following best practice to 
examine the intellectual property strategy contents in the Combat Rescue Helicopter and 
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UH-1N Replacement programs and analyze how each program incorporated the results of 
the best practice into an actionable plan.  
What: Analyze the data required to design, manufacture, and sustain the 
system as well as to support re-competition for production, sustainment, or 
upgrade. Consider baseline documentation data, analysis data, cost data, test 
data, results of reviews, engineering data, drawings, models, and bills of 
materials. (Intellectual Property Cross Functional Team, 2019) 
How: Address how the program will provide for delivery of technical data 
with the appropriate level of rights the government requires for the system’s 
total life-cycle sustainment. Include analysis of data needs to implement the 
product support life-cycle strategy including such areas as materiel 
management, training, information assurance protection, cataloging, open 
architecture, configuration management, engineering, technology 
refreshment, maintenance/repair within the technical order (TO) limits and 
specifically engineered outside of TO limits, and reliability management. 
(Intellectual Property Cross Functional Team, 2019) 
Why: The business case analysis calculation, conducted in concert with the 
engineering tradeoff analysis, outlines the approach for using open systems 
architectures and acquiring IP rights. The cost benefit analysis explains 
whether to include a priced contract option for the future delivery of 
technical data and IP rights not acquired upon initial contract award. An 
analysis of the risk that the contractor may assert limitations on the 
government’s use and release of technical data or computer software (e.g., 
technical data and computer software developed exclusively at the 
contractor’s expense) factors into the strategy. (Intellectual Property Cross 
Functional Team, 2019) 
We will take an in-depth look at the CRH and UH-1N replacement program to 
determine what was completed and what could have been done differently. Determining 
intellectual property requirements in technical data and computer software is no small task, 
especially planning for these requirements across the entire acquisition life cycle. Nash and 
Rawicz (2008) noted the long periods in which the weapon systems remain in use by the 
military drives the DOD programs to create significantly large data requirements early on 
in planning. The IP guidebook promotes the need for discipline in determining technical 
data and computer software requirements,  
To say identifying IP requirements is a challenge would be an 
understatement. If ever there was a Goldilocks exercise in defense 
acquisition, identifying IP requirements is it. The DFARS disallows 
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requiring “all the data.” But experience shows that while having too many 
requirements may be costly and useless, having insufficient data negatively 
impacts life-cycle support. The goal is to establish requirements that are not 
too much, not too little, but just right. (Intellectual Property Cross 
Functional Team, 2019) 
1. Combat Rescue Helicopter 
First, we look at the Combat Rescue Helicopter Program Acquisition Strategy 
signed September 2012 in support of entering the acquisition process at Milestone B 
(EMD). The acquisition strategy identifies the CRH program pursued an acquisition 
approach of full and open competition, with a 14-year period of performance, in a single 
contract for the development, integration, production, and initial sustainment of the CRH 
system (including air vehicles, training systems, and product support). The Combat Rescue 
Helicopter Acquisition Strategy Section 7.6 Technical Data Rights Strategy identifies the 
Air Force anticipates both organizational and depot level maintenance will be organically 
accomplished by the Air Force (Air Force Life Cycle Management Center [AFLCMC], 
2012). The requirements of the CRH program for a contract that covers development, 
production, and initial sustainment, and a strategy to pursue organic maintenance requires 
significant consideration be given to the intellectual property requirements of the program 
to meet those objectives. In determining the data requirements, the acquisition strategy 
identifies the CRH program team utilized a directorate (squadron) level integrated product 
(IPT) team to define the CRH system data requirements and implement a data management 
strategy. Section 7.6.1 Data Requirements Analysis states, 
The Rotary Wing Data Management Integrated Product Team, consisting 
of the [CRH Program Office (PO)] and HH-60G sustainment office, 
evaluated sustainment lessons learned from the current fleet. This 
evaluation helped to define the CRH system data requirements. Additional 
analysis determined that future support of software and avionics may 
require CRH to pursue the acquisition of all data required to modify the 
CRH Systems Software and/or Operational Flight Program, depending on 
the platform selected. (AFLCMC, 2012) 
The use of an integrated IPT to assess the data requirements for the CRH program 
was successful and allowed the team to evaluate and share lessons learned from the HH-
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60G program. The IPT also contributed to identifying areas of future requirements for 
technical data and computer software.  
CRH Acquisition Strategy Section 7.6.2 Technical Data Rights, Access, and 
Delivery Summary identifies how to the CRH program will provide for delivery of 
technical data and computer software with the appropriate level of  rights the CRH requires 
to implement an organic maintenance capability in the future. The CRH program identifies 
it will pursue rights as detailed in DFARS clauses 252.227-7013 and 252.227-7014, Rights 
in Technical Data-Noncommercial Items and Rights in Noncommercial Computer 
Software and Computer Software Documentation, respectively. The CRH program relies 
on the standard rights under these two clauses which are determined by source of funding 
in development, purpose of the data, and if the ICP is noncommercial or commercial. The 
CRH program also identifies it will pursue standard rights in commercial technical data 
and commercial software, however,  identifies it will seek unlimited rights in commercial 
technical data for OMIT and FFF data. A review of the rights in technical data and 
computer software pursued by the CRH program are consistent with the standard DFARS 
clauses determining rights in technical data and computer software.  
The IP guidebook identifies a third area of consideration in creating an actionable 
IP strategy, which is to conduct activities to support the “why” of life cycle support by 
completing analyses for business case and engineering tradeoff to support the IP strategy. 
Section 7.6.3 Business Case Analyses and Section 7.6.4 Cost Benefit Analysis for Priced 
Options are identified as subsections of the technical data rights strategy which can ensure 
programs are conducting the appropriate analysis to consider affordability of the strategy 
and appropriate tradeoffs. Limited information is provided under Business Case Analyses, 
and only one sentence is provided for under Cost Benefit Analysis for Priced Options. 
Section 7.6.3 Business Case Analyses states, “the Source of Repair Analysis, as 
coordinated through HQ AFMC/A4 (Logistics), had indicated both depot and supply will 
be organic. Therefore, the CRH Program will ensure all necessary data rights are addressed 
as part of an inclusive EMD and production contract” (Air Force Life Cycle Management 
Center, 2012). Section 7.6.3 Business Case Analyses does not include an assessment of the 
cost to acquire IP rights, or considerations for engineering tradeoff analysis or open 
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systems architecture by the program team. Lastly, section 7.6.4 Cost Benefit Analysis for 
Priced Contract Options states, “The CRH program will procure the necessary data rights 
as part of the contract” (AFLCMC, 2012). The lack of information provided in this section 
of the technical data rights strategy indicates potential difficulties in estimating the cost of 
options for future delivery of data, but indicates the program may evaluate priced options 
for future delivery of data as part of the award of the contract, which would require the 
program to include a requirement for priced options in the request for proposal (RFP) 
requirements.  
The final section of the Technical Data Rights Strategy covering limitations on the 
government’s use of data acknowledges “there is a risk that the selected contractor will 
assert limitations for use on some portions of data” (AFLCMC, 2012). To support the 
acquisition strategy, the CRH program conducted market research that identified several 
potential offerors capable of meeting the CRH requirement. The risk identified in this 
section of the technical data rights strategy simply acknowledges that the future contractor 
awardee may assert limitations on the government’s use of data based on the source of 
funds used to develop the CRH technology by the company. Some offerors developed CRH 
technology exclusively with private funds, while others developed technology with 
government funds, which means the government could obtain less rights in CRH 
technology, such as limited or restricted rights, if the selected awardee developed CRH 
technology with exclusively private funds.  
The second program document we reviewed for the CRH program was the Life 
Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP) signed 1 November 2013 in support of Milestone B. We 
focused our analysis of the LCSP to the product support strategy, subsection 3.3.6 
Technical Data/Data Rights. In review of the section, the content contained is similar to 
the information provided in the intellectual property strategy of the acquisition strategy, 
but, in addition the CRH program includes a definition of OMIT data and non-OMIT data 
to provide clarity to the OMIT data the government intends to pursue in the contract in 
order to recompete sustainment. We found the OMIT definition is later utilized by the CRH 
program to create a special section H clause in the RFP. We provide our analysis of the 
OMIT definition in Section H Clauses.  
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In a full-view assessment of the intellectual property strategy for the CRH program, 
the CRH program sufficiently addressed most areas required by the DOD 5000.02 and 
provided summary results in an actionable plan format to describe how the CRH program 
would pursue delivery of data and license rights. The IP strategy falls short, however, in 
providing detail under the sections for business case analysis and priced options for 
delivery of data. The business case analysis section indicates a Source of Repair Analysis 
was conducted and indicated organic maintenance would be the long-term maintenance 
strategy, but within the IP strategy no information is provided to address open systems 
architecture or potential engineering tradeoffs in considering the IP strategy. While the 
technical data rights strategy section does address the required minimum information under 
DOD 5000.02 for IP strategy, in other areas of acquisition planning we did observe a 
number of useful practices conducted by the CRH program that the IG Guidebook 
identifies as useful strategies to determine the long-term data needs of the program. These 
activities include extensive market research of the competitive environment, industry days, 
and data calls conducted by the data management team. Additionally, the RFP development 
included extensive consideration of technical data and computer software needs in creating 
the contract data requirements list (CDRL), OMIT and non-OMIT assertions list,  inclusion 
of DFARS clauses, and utilizing product support-data management as a technical 
evaluation subfactor in source selection criteria. While the IP strategy included as part of 
the acquisition strategy occurs early in the acquisition process, updating the IP strategy and 
incorporating additional information outside of the minimum required information by 
DOD 5000.02 with actions taken by the team in acquisition planning and developing the 
RFP would create an IP strategy document that more adequately describes how the CRH 
program is obtaining delivery and adequate level of rights in data.  
2. UH-1N Replacement  
The second program we looked at was the UH-1N Replacement Program, to include 
the  Pre-Award Acquisition Strategy approved July 2017 and the Life Cycle Sustainment 
Plan supporting Milestone C approved March 2018. The acquisition strategy identifies the 
UH-1N replacement program pursued an acquisition approach to procure an existing 
airworthiness certified baseline air vehicle and baseline training system using full and open 
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competition,  for the production and non-developmental integration of the UH-1N system 
(including air vehicles, training systems, test support, product support package, and data). 
The long-term sustainment strategy identified a two-level concept that could include both 
contractor support and organic maintenance capability. While the UH-1N replacement 
program entered the acquisition life cycle process at Milestone C, opting for an existing 
system and not to develop a new system under EMD, significant considerations in 
intellectual property are required to ensure program obtains the necessary delivery and 
appropriate level of rights in data. Within the Acquisition Strategy, under the Business 
Strategy category, the UH-1N Program creates the Intellectual Property Strategy. Section 
7.7 Intellectual Property Strategy states, 
The Government will obtain rights in technical data and computer software 
deliverables in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 2320 and DFARS 227.71, 
227.72, 252.227-7013, 252.227-7014, and 252.227-7015. Pursuant to these 
authorities, while the Government is entitled to receive Unlimited Rights in 
certain deliverables, the Government will pursue Government Purpose 
Rights for technical data necessary for Operation, Maintenance, 
Installation, or Training (OMIT) purposes and form, fit, and function data. 
For data pertaining to an item, component or process developed exclusively 
with Government funds, as well as non-commercial computer software 
developed exclusively at Government expense and computer software 
documentation, the Government will retain entitlement to unlimited rights. 
For non-commercial computer software (except OMIT) developed 
exclusively at private expense, the Government will receive Restricted 
Rights. For non-commercial technical data (except OMIT) where the item 
was developed entirely at private expense, the Government will receive 
Limited Rights. For technical data related to items, components or processes 
and non-commercial computer software developed partly at Government 
expense and partly at private expense, the Government shall have 
Government Purpose Rights. The Government may also receive 
commercial technical data that will be subject to restrictions set forth in 
DFARS 252.227-7015 unless it is OMIT or another type of data that is 
subject to Unlimited Rights. The IP strategy will be updated to address 
evolving IP considerations associated with source selection and contract 
award. (AFLCMC, 2017). 
In an assessment of the above language, the UH-1N Replacement Program 
intellectual property strategy relied on the statutory language of 10 U.S.C. § 2320 and the 
standard license rights provided in DFARS clauses to obtain rights in technical data and 
computer software. The IP strategy highlights the government’s authority to obtain 
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unlimited rights in OMIT data, however, the program office acknowledges it will only 
pursue government purpose rights (GPR) in OMIT and FFF data. The program office 
determined GPR in OMIT data were sufficient to meet the requirement. A potential benefit 
in pursuing GPR instead of unlimited rights is a signal to industry that the government did 
not want to overreach in acquiring rights to data and would protect the data by utilizing the 
technical data and computer software for government purposes only.  
In addition to the standard rights pursued under the DFARS clauses, Section 7.1 
Intellectual Property strategy identifies two clauses intended to pursue specifically 
negotiated rights, AFLCMC/WIH-H002, Commercial Computer Software License and 
AFLCMC/WIH-H003, Delivery and License Rights for Technical Data and Computer 
Software Necessary for Operations, Maintenance, Installation, and Training. The 
intellectual property strategy states,  
Pursuant to AFLCMC/WIH-H002, offerors are to provide any licenses for 
commercial software to be transferred to the Government with their 
proposal submission, and those commercial software licenses are required 
to be compliant with certain required terms and conditions stated in the 
clause. Pursuant to AFLCMC/WIH- H003, OMIT Data is specifically 
defined to include non-commercial computer software necessary for OMIT 
purposes (other than detailed manufacturing or process data). (AFLCMC, 
2017) 
With the combination of the standard DFARS clauses and the Section H clauses, 
the program office makes a strong effort to define what type of data and level of rights are 
required by the program office for the long-term sustainment of UH-1N Replacement 
system. Where the DFARS clauses lack clarity in the definition of OMIT data, the Section 
H clauses clarify to offerors the government’s definition of OMIT data for this program, to 
include non-commercial computer software necessary for OMIT. Providing clarity in 
OMIT data serves to ensure all offerors submit proposals for the same requirements, while 
also ensuring the government does not exceed the statutory limits of rights in technical data 
by seeking rights to detailed manufacturing or process data. 
The intellectual property strategy is further broken down in subsections addressing 
data rights analysis, provision for technical data rights in sustainment, technical manuals, 
and integrated digital environment. We utilize the IP Guidebook best practice to analyze 
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how the IP Strategy addresses the required contents of the DOD 5000.02 and furthermore 
how each section of the IP Strategy contributes to creating an actionable plan. Section 
7.7.1. Data Rights Analysis states,  
The Government will pursue the least restrictive rights in technical data and 
computer software but anticipates contractor-asserted restrictions on those 
rights. The Government will review and challenge those assertions as 
appropriate. The UH-1N Replacement program RFP will require offerors to 
identify and assert any restrictions on use, modification, reproduction, 
release or disclosure of technical data in accordance with DFARS Clause 
252.227-7017, Identification and Assertion of Use, Release, or Disclosure 
Restrictions (AFLCMC, 2017). 
Section 7.7.1 Data Rights Analysis describes the process the government will use 
to review and challenge contractor asserted rights in technical data and computer software. 
The DFARS clause 252.227-7017 identifies the standard process for offerors to follow in 
asserting rights in data, but section also describes a Section H clause AFLCMC/WIH-
H004, Identification and Assertion of Restrictions of Technical Data and Computer 
Software that identifies additional requirements for offerors. The special H clause 
AFLCMC/WIH-H004 places additional requirements on the contractor to identify contract 
line item numbers, CDRLs, and statement of work paragraphs to provide traceability of 
data requirements.  
Analyzing Section 7.7 Intellectual Property Strategy and 7.7.1 Data Right Analysis 
together, these sections include specific details of “how” the UH-1N Replacement program 
will provide for delivery of data and ensure the appropriate level of data rights are obtained. 
The program office will utilize standard and non-standard Section H clauses to determine 
the allocation of rights in data and will utilize standard and non-standard Section H clauses 
to describe the assertions process the program office will use to review and challenge 
contractor restrictions in technical data and computer software.  
Section 7.7.2 Provision of Technical Data Rights in Sustainment provides a 
summary analysis of steps taken by the program team to identify the long-term data 
requirements of the UH-1N replacement system. Within this section, the program team 
considered data needs to meet future competition for logistics support, including spares 
and repairs, of the system, subsystems, and components. The section also describes how 
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program office plans to include requirements in the RFP for deferred ordering of technical 
data and computer software and a data accession list for reporting of data not required to 
be delivered. The section describes the combination of deferred ordering and the data 
accession list create a beneficial strategy for the program to identify future requirements 
for delivery of additional data not originally obtained as part of the contract. The section 
describes clear actions taken by the UH-1N Replacement program to answer the “what” of 
the IP Guidebook best practice by highlighting assessment of data needs for long term 
sustainment and future re-competition at the system and subsystem level.  
Section 7.7.3 Technical manuals describes the establishment of a Technical Order 
Management Agency (TOMA) to manage development and delivery of technical manuals, 
including maintenance manuals, flight manuals, and time compliance technical orders 
(TCTO). The section describes that modifications throughout the entire life cycle of the 
program will be accomplished by TCTOs and will require updates to the appropriate 
manuals. This section of the IP strategy provided information above the minimum required 
information by DOD 5000.02, but provides valuable information to address “how” the 
program will manage modifications to the system and subsystem. Establishing the TOMA 
will contribute to keeping critical program technical documentation up-to-date and assist 
the program in tracking the governments rights in data regarding modifications.  
Section 7.7.4 Integrated Digital Environment addresses that the statement of work 
will direct the contractor to provide access to a contractor electronic data repository, a  
complete list of documents created during the program. In addition to the contractor 
repository,  the government will create its own government data repository to ensure the 
team has continued access to program data for future purposes. This section includes 
content above the minimum required by the DOD 5000.02 intellectual property strategy, 
but highlights a unique consideration by the program to ensure the government has 
continued access to data for future sustainment purposes, in the event the government 
recompetes sustainment support and no longer maintains contractual access to the 
contractor’s data repository. 
The second program document we reviewed for the UH-1N Replacement program 
was the Life Cycle Sustainment Plan (LCSP) used to support Milestone C entrance. We 
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focused our analysis of the LCSP to Annex 3, Intellectual Property Strategy. At Milestone 
C, the IP Strategy become a required annex to the LCSP in accordance with DOD 5000.02 
policy (Enclosure 2, Section 6a(4)). Upon review of the section, the content is identical to 
the content provided in the intellectual property strategy of the acquisition strategy 
document. No new information is provided within Annex 3, Intellectual Property Strategy.  
In a full-view assessment of the intellectual property strategy for the UH-1N 
Replacement Program, the intellectual property strategy goes into significant detail to 
create an actionable strategy that identifies what data is required, how rights in data will be 
verified, how the data will be managed, and how the data will be stored. The IP guidebook 
identifies those considerations as important to creating an actionable plan for the 
intellectual property strategy and go above and beyond the minimum requirements stated 
in DOD 5000.02 Intellectual Property Strategy. When we compare UH-1N intellectual 
property strategy to the CRH intellectual property strategy, we see some key differences 
that we identify as significant improvements to the IP strategy development. The UH-1N 
IP Strategy provides important details to how the government will handle problems 
between the government and the contractor in the asserting and markings of rights and 
provides additional clarity to the process with the inclusion of H clauses. Additionally, the 
UH-1N IP Strategy identifies important considerations given the management of data 
utilizing the TOMA and government data repository. One area we not see addressed in the 
UH-1N IP Strategy is a business case analysis for the approach to acquiring rights. The IP 
guidebook recommends answering the “why” of the intellectual property strategy by 
conducting a business case analysis that considers potential engineering tradeoffs and 
provides and assessment for priced contract options for future delivery of data. Although 
the UH-1N Replacement Program did not provide business case calculations for these areas 
within the strategy, the program did note in section 7.7.2 that the RFP requirement would 
include the option for deferred ordering of data. Overall, UH-1N Replacement program’s 
IP Strategy displays significant improvement, compared to the CRH program, in the 
development of the IP Strategy which culminates in a clear actionable strategy that 
identifies  information in what data is required, how rights in data will be verified, how the 
data will be managed, and how the data will be stored. While these acquisitions are 
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conducted by different program offices, the improvements to the IP Strategies indicate the 
Air Force is placing increased efforts on improving its acquisition and management of 
technical data and computer software in its weapon systems.  
B. SECTION H CLAUSES 
H Clauses are a special set of clauses residing in Section H of the Uniform Contract 
Format (UCF) that are determined contract to contract by the acquisition team. They are 
written specifically for an individual contract and are meant to address an aspect of a 
procurement that is not adequately covered by the FAR or DFARS (FAR 15.204-2(h)). 
Due to their customized, specialized nature, clauses put in Section H of any contract require 
a much higher level of approval, often requiring a senior contracting official to approve 
each clause individually.  
In the four contracts that we were able to obtain clauses for, two of them had very 
similar H clauses. The UH-1N Replacement program had seven Section H clauses (UH-
1N Replacement, 2017), the T-7A had five (T-7A Red Hawk, 2018), and the Combat 
Request Helicopter had three (Combat Rescue Helicopter, 2012). The Combat Rescue 
Helicopter program is a much earlier procurement effort, with clauses dating from 2012, 
and that is likely why the program had fewer special clauses and why the clauses are the 
most unique. The earliest effort, the KC-46 Pegasus, has twenty-seven H Clauses, and is 
by far the most unique of the four contracts (KC-X, 2009).  
Of the seven H Clauses in the UH-1N Replacement Contract, three of them were 
shared by the T-7A contract, at least by the clause titles. Those three clauses were: 
Commercial Computer Software License; Delivery and License Rights for Technical Data 
and Computer Software Necessary for Operation, Maintenance, Installation, and Training 
(OMIT); and Identification and Assertion of Restrictions of Technical Data and Computer 
Software. While the titles are the same, the clauses were given different agency clause 
numbers and different dates.  
While it would be tempting to use the KC-X solicitation as a baseline, one should 
regard its high number of Section H clauses as an outlier. Instead, using the Combat Rescue 
Helicopter procurement as a sort of baseline, one can tell that the USAF has recognized 
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not only the utility of specialized clauses written into Section H, but also their importance 
when it comes to intellectual property in weapon system procurement. Not only did the 
UH-1N Replacement program and the T-7A add additional clauses, their clauses are more 
refined and concise when dealing with issues of intellectual property in weapon system 
procurement.  
C. OMIT CLAUSE 
All four of the systems that we were able to obtain clauses for had an H Clause 
addressing OMIT data for the individual procurements. In both the UH-1N and the T-7A 
procurement, the clause is titled “Delivery and License Rights for Technical Data and 
Computer Software Necessary for Operation, Maintenance, Installation, and Training 
(OMIT).” As with the other clauses in Section H of both contracts, the UH-1N OMIT 
clause is dated from 2017, while the T-7A is dated 2016. Other than that, the clauses are 
extremely similar, with only a few differences.  
In the Combat Rescue Helicopter procurement, the clause is titled “Delivery and 
License Rights for Technical Data and Computer Software Necessary for Organizational 
and Depot-Level Maintenance and Training Systems” and is dated 2012. Despite the earlier 
date, and the different title, the clause addresses OMIT data relatively quickly, although 
the remainder of the clause focuses on depot-level maintenance, with references to OMIT 
data throughout. It appears that this clause is a sort of proto-OMIT data clause that serves 
as an example for future procurements.  
A similar clause appears in the KC-X solicitation, titled “Delivery and License 
Rights For Technical Data and Computer Software Necessary for Two-Level Maintenance 
and Training Systems” (KC-X, 2009). Despite its different title, like the Combat Rescue 
Helicopter, this clause is also focused mostly on depot-level maintenance and devotes only 
a paragraph to define what constitutes OMIT data. With 27 clauses in Section H, the KC-
X acquisition serves mostly as an example of what can be accomplished with specialized 
H clauses.  
Both OMIT-titled clauses start with a definition of OMIT data, and the definition 
is nearly identical in both procurements. In the UH-1N Replacement, there is reference to 
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“developmental tools,” when defining OMIT data, which is neglected in the T-7A. Oddly 
enough, those developmental tools are included in the Combat Rescue Helicopter’s 
definition of OMIT data under its Depot-Level Maintenance clause.  
The definition of OMIT data is important, and neither the FAR or the DFARS 
explains how a PMO is supposed to define OMIT data (Intellectual Property Cross 
Functional Team, 2019). In the recently published USAF guidebook on Data Rights in 
Weapon System procurement, the third chapter deals almost entirely with OMIT data and 
helping acquisition professionals define OMIT data for their program.  
The earliest program we were able to acquire clauses from, the KC-X (now known 
as the KC-46 Pegasus), had the least-well defined OMIT clause of the four that we had. To 
be fair to that program, the clause was focused more on Depot-Level, or “Two-Level” 
Maintenance, with only a short sub-paragraph dedicated to defining OMIT data. This 
clause may not be considered up to standard compared to the current guidance given in the 
Air Force Data Rights Guidebook. This can be forgiven, as the KC-46 Pegasus 
procurement began 10 years prior to the guidebook being published.  
What can be easily seen in all four of the procurements that we were able to get 
clauses for, is the influence that previous efforts had on the development of the USAF Data 
Rights Guidebook. On page 28 of the Guidebook, under guidance for developing the 
request for proposals, the Data Rights Guidebook recommends that the PMO include a 
special clause that further defines what constitutes OMIT, beyond simply demanding the 
Unlimited Rights that are permitted under the DFARS (Intellectual Property Cross 
Functional Team, 2019).  
In the UH-1N Replacement Program, instead of demanding Unlimited Rights, the 
PMO chose to pursue only Government Purpose Rights (UH-1N Replacement, 2017). One 
reason for this may be that the UH-1N replacement is a commercially derived helicopter, 
developed in partnership between Boeing and Italian aerospace company Leonardo, based 
off the AW139. Dubbed the MH-139 by the contractor partnership, the helicopter is already 
in service with several allied partners and was procured as a commercial item to replace 
the ancient UH-1N in the USAF inventory.  
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Perhaps the PMO that awarded the UH-1N replacement program to Boeing and 
Leonardo wanted to show respect for the commercially derived nature of the data rights 
that came with the MH-139 (UH-1N Replacement, 2018). Refraining from demanding 
Unlimited Rights on the commercially derived aircraft and reducing the OMIT demand 
down to Government Purpose Rights may have also provided a price benefit in the overall 
cost of the replacement program.  
In contrast to the procurement of the commercially derived MH-139, the Air 
Force’s fifth generation training aircraft, the T-7A Red Hawk, was developed to address a 
specific need. The previous jet fighter trainer, the T-38C Talon, does not adequately 
prepare USAF fighter pilots for the successful operation of fifth-generation fighter and 
bomber aircraft, such as the F-35 Lightning II and the B-21 Raider. Documented gaps in 
the USAF pilot training program indicates that the T-38C Talon has shortcomings in 12 of 
the 18 major mission tasks set forth in Undergraduate Pilot Training (Coral & Gertler, 
2019).  
The T-7A Red Hawk was developed specifically to meet those shortfalls, and the 
OMIT clause reflects that. Unlike the UH-1N replacement, the MH-139, the T-7A program 
requires that the government be given Unlimited Data Rights in the OMIT clause in Section 
H (T-7A Red Hawk, 2018). While we were unable to obtain a copy of the data assertions 
for the T-7A due to current classification and information security, an assumption can be 
made that the government was able to obtain unlimited OMIT data rights because the T-
7A was developed at government expense and in response to an established government 
requirement.  
D. DEPOT-LEVEL MAINTENANCE CLAUSE 
As previously mentioned, whereas the two later procurement efforts included an 
OMIT clause in Section H, the Combat Rescue Helicopter and the KC-46 Pegasus included 
a clause addressing Depot-Level Maintenance. Both procurements’ Depot-Level 
Maintenance clause contained a generic description of OMIT data, but the focus was on 
the definition of Depot-Level Maintenance.  
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In the OMIT clauses for both the UH-1N Replacement and the T-7A Red Hawk 
programs, there remains discussion of Depot-Level Maintenance, although the level of 
importance appears to have flipped. In the Combat Rescue Helicopter, Depot-Level 
Maintenance is the primary focus of the clause, whereas this definition is relegated to a 
vestige of its former appearance. In the T-7A OMIT clause, Depot-Level Maintenance 
occupies only a seven-line sub-paragraph that focuses primary on the data required to 
perform that maintenance (T-7A Red Hawk, 2018), and in the UH-1N Replacement OMIT 
clause uses just a full paragraph to define Depot-Level Maintenance (UH-1N Replacement, 
2017).  
This reduction in importance of Depot-Level Maintenance over several years’ 
worth of procurements could indicate a shift toward understanding the importance of 
OMIT data and how it is defined within contract requirements prior to award.  
E. OMIT DEFINITION 
The OMIT definitions across all four of the contracts for which we were able to 
obtain Section Hs are similar enough that they raise the question of why each individual 
agency had to come up with its own clause? In two of the four contracts we obtained, OMIT 
data is defined for the system as:  
All technical data, development tools, computer software, computer 
software documentation, computer databases and graphics … required or 
used when conducting all operation, maintenance, installation, and training 
activities, regardless of whether such activities are performed by Air Force 
military, civilian, or contract personnel. (T-7A Red Hawk, 2018; UH-1N 
Replacement, 2017) 
With only a few inconsequential exceptions, the clauses are identical. Even the 
definitions contained within the clauses for operation, maintenance, installation, and 
training are similar enough to where replacing the program name with “the system” 
produces nearly verbatim identical clauses. It appears that agencies are merely duplicating 
each other’s efforts to produce their own OMIT Data clauses for Section H.  
To be fair to the writers of the T-7A Red Hawk contract, their Section H OMIT Clause 
appears to be more robust. For instance, where the UH-1N Replacement Section H states 
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that “maintenance” includes various items “to maintain in, or restore to, a serviceable 
condition the UH-1 N Replacement System” (UH-1N Replacement, 2017), the T-7A Red 
Hawk is more specific and inclusive: “to maintain in, or restore to, a serviceable condition 
the APT aircraft system and GBTS; and their subsystems, assemblies, subassemblies, 
components, parts, and pieces (whether hardware or software)” (T-7A Red Hawk, 2018). 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Department of Defense establishes significant long-term investments in major 
weapon systems, and in doing so creates important partnerships with industry. Protecting 
the interests of both parties in that partnership is essential to ensuring the DOD has 
continued access to an innovative industrial base, and that industry that understands the 
mission of the DOD to support the warfighter must be accomplished in a cost-effective 
manner (Department of Defense, 2018). The government’s increased efforts to identify and 
analyze intellectual property issues makes clear the importance of the role of intellectual 
property to meeting DOD objectives. The issues surrounding IP are complex and require 
the DOD to take the time necessary to create in-depth intellectual property strategies to 
ensure the DOD programs obtain the necessary technical data and computer software along 
with the appropriate license rights to ensure the DOD can effectively and affordably meet 
future sustainment requirements in its major weapon systems.  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Through our research we were able to answer our four research questions. While 
we acknowledge that this research does not represent an “end-all-be-all” in terms of a 
solution to intellectual property issues, we do believe that our research represents an 
important step forward in understanding intellectual property rights in government 
procurement, as well as educating government procurement officials on how to best handle 
intellectual property in their acquisitions. We also acknowledge that based on the number 
of programs reviewed in this project, our conclusion should not be used to generalize all 
programs across the Air Force, however, the results provide useful insights into the efforts 
of these programs to address intellectual property issues. Based on our research questions, 
we reached the following conclusions: 
1. Is the United States Air Force sufficiently addressing intellectual 
property in the acquisition planning of major weapon systems? 
Based on the research of analyzing intellectual property strategies contained in the 
acquisition strategy and life cycle sustainment plan of past weapon system acquisitions, the 
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programs met the DOD acquisition planning policy requirements at DFARS 207.106 (S-
70) Additional requirements for major systems in developing acquisition plans for major 
weapons and subsystems of weapon systems. The intellectual property strategies 
developed in the programs met the broad requirement of the DFARS policy to assess the 
long-term technical data and computer software needs for the program. The broad 
requirement of the DFARS policy leaves the door open for programs to determine the steps 
to take to meet this requirement. The DFARS policy does not mandate specific elements 
of assessment, other than to address the merits of priced options for the future delivery or 
technical data and computer software with associated license rights. Therefore, programs 
are allowed to determine the elements included in Intellectual Property Strategy, which can 
lead to differences seen in IP Strategies across programs. Our analysis included four 
programs within the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, therefore, we observed 
similarities in the IP strategies, but also some differences where we observed improvements 
to the IP strategies over time. We expect there may be more significant disparity in 
Intellectual Property Strategies content with other organizations and military services. 
Therefore, we believe additional guidance, such as the guidance provided in the new Air 
Force IP Guidebook, can provide weapon system programs with valuable information to 
create intellectual property strategies that are robust and improve how the Air Force 
handles IP issues with contractors. A successful acquisition begins with in-depth 
acquisition planning, therefore, if the Air Force is to improve its acquisition and 
management of intellectual property, it must conduct adequate planning to create an 
actionable IP strategy that describes what data is required, how rights in data will be 
verified, how the data will be managed, and how the data will be stored. Giving adequate 
consideration to these areas will go a long way to ensure the Air Force obtains adequate 
intellectual property license rights to ensure our major weapon systems are affordable and 
adaptable. 
Furthermore, within the last year the Air Force has undertaken significant efforts to 
improve its own strategy to address intellectual property issues across the Air Force. The 
Air Force has made intellectual property issues a top priority,  establishing an Air Force IP 
Cadre, analyzing the findings of the 2016 NDAA congressionally mandated panels, and 
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issuing an Air Force IP Guidebook. While our research mainly focused on the acquisition 
planning efforts of the four weapon systems programs, the Air Force IP Guidebook will be 
a valuable new resource for all program offices to improve acquisition planning for 
intellectual property but also improve the handling of IP issues across the entire life cycle 
of Air Fore weapon systems.  
2. What contract clauses are contracting officers using to acquire 
intellectual property and data rights?  
Within our research, we found the programs relied on both standard data rights 
clauses and non-standard data rights clauses. The programs utilized the applicable standard 
DFARS clauses when determining license rights in  both non-commercial and commercial 
technical data. The standard DFARS clauses were used for the contractor’s asserting 
restrictions to data, and for the government’s validation of the restrictive markings. The 
standard DFARS clauses included: 
• DFARS 252.227-7013 - Rights in Technical Data – Noncommercial 
Items 
 
• DFARS 252.227-7014 - Rights in Noncommercial Computer Software 
and  Computer Software Documentation 
 
• DFARS 252.227-7015 Technical Data – Commercial Items 
 
• DFARS 252.227-7017 Identification and Assertion of Use, Release, or 
Disclosure Restriction 
 
• DFARS 252.227-7037 Validation of Restrictive Markings on Technical 
Data 
For commercial computer software and computer software documentation, CRH 
program relied on DFARS 227.7202-1 to pursue license rights customarily provided to the 
public, unless specific modifications were made at government expense to meet 
requirements. The UH-1N Replacement program utilized the standard DFARS policy for 
commercial computer software, and in addition utilized a non-standard H clause to require 
offerors to provide any commercial software licenses to be transferred to the government 
with the submission of the proposal. 
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For non-OMIT data, contracting officers are using relying on the statutory language 
of 10 U.S.C. § 2320 and the standard clauses provided in DFARS 252.227-7013, 252.227-
7014, and 252.227-7015.  
For OMIT data, contracting officers are utilizing special contract requirements, laid 
out in Section H of major weapon system procurements in order to acquire intellectual 
property and data rights. These clauses are customized to each contract, and therefore can 
address specific concerns that may not apply to other procurements. Even though the 
clauses are written by different contracting officers, they often share significant similarities 
that indicate it may be beneficial to formulate a standardized clause, or set of clauses, to 
address the acquisition of intellectual property. 
3. How  does the Air Force ensure adequate deliverables and license 
rights are obtained in operation, maintenance, installation, and 
training data within contracts? 
The increased emphasis to obtain adequate license rights in technical data and 
computer software stems from previous acquisition situations, such as the C-17, where the 
Air Force was unable to meet an organic sustainment requirement and promote competition 
in sustainment due to vendor lock. Also, observing the rising costs of programs such as the 
F-35 and the F-22, calls attention to Air Force’s efforts to obtain OMIT data and the need 
to ensure delivery and adequate license rights in technical data and computer software 
necessary for operation, maintenance, installation, and training.  
The Air Force is using clauses in Section H of weapon system procurements to 
define operation, maintenance, installation, and training data. Due to the customizable 
nature of these clauses, the definition of OMIT data has evolved over time as newer 
procurements learn from previous weapon system acquisition efforts. There is no 
standardized definition of OMIT data from either the FAR or the DFARs, and the Air Force 
has the potential to take the lead by defining OMIT through AFFARs guidance.  
 The lack of definition causes some significant friction between government 
and industry, as was seen through the UH-1N replacement program and the protest levied 
against that procurement. In some instances, the Air Force tends to ask for the wrong level 
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of ownership over intellectual property by claiming everything is OMIT data. In some 
instances, the Air Force simply asks for unnecessary data, leading to increased workload 
for both contractor and government personnel. Formalizing a definition with feedback from 
industry should reduce the number of protests over OMIT data definitions, and the level of 
work required by both industry partners and government procurement officials.  
4. What are the main factors that create friction between the Air Force 
and contractors when negotiating intellectual property rights? 
In our background research, we noted, DOD problems in intellectual property have 
centered around two basic issues: (1) how much technical information to obtain from 
contractors, and (2) what protection the government should afford to the technical 
information obtained (Nash & Rawicz, 2008). In our analysis of the program IP strategies, 
we found answering these two basic questions is a challenge unique to each weapon 
system. When determining the long-term needs in technical data and computer software, 
two of the main considerations are what type of data is required by the program and what 
level of license rights in the data are required to support future competition in sustainment 
and affordable weapon systems. While the DOD addresses these issues in each acquisition, 
at the same time, contractors must consider how the DoDs IP strategy protects their 
intellectual property and meets the contractor’s interests. Based on our research,  three of 
the main contributing factors that lead to issues between the Air Force and contractors 
when dealing with intellectual property occur in requirements determination, the assertions 
process, and the lack of an OMIT data definition in statute or DFARS policy. DOD efforts 
to improve acquisition planning early in the acquisition process can help to establish 
defined data requirements. Additionally, early planning by the program office to work with 
industry partners can alleviate contractor concerns in the assertions process. Finally, 
establishing a firm, but fair definition of OMIT data relieves much of the stress between 




Improvements to the Defense Acquisition System are being discussed across the 
DOD with recommendations coming out of the Section 809 and Section 813 Panels, as 
well as the Section 875 Study. These panels are the stepping-stone for the DOD to 
implement significant changes to acquisition system and the processes the DOD uses. The 
DOD should carefully consider recommendations to intellectual property acquisition 
processes that are critical to the future ability of the DOD to reshape the Defense 
Acquisition System. Based on our analysis of the four Air Force programs (the UH-1N 
Replacement, T-7A Advanced Pilot Trainer, Combat Rescue Helicopter, and KC-46 
Pegasus Tanker), our recommendation for improvements to the acquisition of technical 
data and computer software and data license rights include the following: 
1. Recommendation 1: Special “Fill-in” Clause for OMIT Data 
Requirements 
Regarding the special Section H Clauses, our first recommendation is that the Air 
Force should create a standardized “fill-in” clause to address OMIT data requirements. 
This clause should contain the generic similarities that exist between commercial and non-
commercial acquisitions, with the ability to tailor the clause to the specific acquisition.  
This differs from the status quo in that, currently, each agency could completely re-
write their OMIT data clause from one contract to the next if they so choose. Establishing 
a standardized OMIT fill-in clause, perhaps under the Air Force Supplement to the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (AFFARS), will standardize how the Air Force asks for data, 
while still granting the flexibility to change what data rights the acquisition team agrees 
upon.  
A potential “fill-in” clause would look similar to the one contained within the T-
7A Red Hawk procurement, with fill-in provisions allowing the acquisition team to tailor 
the clause to each specific procurement: 
(a) Definitions. As used in this special contract requirement and associated 
CLINs: 
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1. “OMIT Data” is defined for the purposes of this contract as all technical data, 
computer software, computer software documentation, computer data bases and 
graphics pertaining to the <Fill In here> required to successfully conduct all 
operation, maintenance, installation, and training activities, regardless of whether 
such activities are performed by Air Force military, civilian, or contract 
personnel. 
A. OPERATION 
“Operation” includes all procedures, guidance, and instructions for ground and 
inflight operating, handling, testing, emergency, utilization, familiarization, and 
functional use of the <Fill in here> to perform their intended functions. 
Operation also includes all data to identify, catalog, stock, source, acquire, 
procure, replenish, package, handle, store, and transport of the <Fill in here>; and 
their subsystems, assemblies, subassemblies, components, parts, and pieces. 
B. MAINTENANCE 
“Maintenance” includes all scheduled and unscheduled organizational, 
intermediate, and depot-level maintenance and repair capabilities to maintain, 
inspect, test, service, adjust, troubleshoot, analyze, remove, replace, repair, install, 
disassemble, reassemble, and overhaul to maintain in, or restore to, a serviceable 
condition the <Fill in here>; and their subsystems, assemblies, subassemblies, 
components, parts, and pieces (whether hardware or software). Maintenance 
includes sustainment of the OMIT data itself. 
C. INSTALLATION 
“Installation” includes infrastructure such as facility planning, site surveys, <Fill 
in as required> communications, data links, security, data information 
technology, and all other data and planning necessary for the initial standup and 
continued operations, training, sustainment, and maintenance at all operational 
sites as well as organizational, intermediate, and depot-level maintenance 
requirements in support of the <Fill in here>; and their subsystems, assemblies, 
subassemblies, components, parts, and pieces. 
D. TRAINING 
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“Training” includes Type 1 training and all other formal and informal classroom, 
<Fill in as required> supervised and unsupervised instruction in the flight of, 
operation of, use of, testing of, supply chain management of, and the 
organizational, intermediate, and depot-level maintenance of the <Fill in here> 
and their subsystems, assemblies, subassemblies, components, parts, and pieces. 
 
2. The term “depot-level maintenance” as used in this contract- 
A. Includes, but is not limited to- 
(i) Installation, inspection, localization, isolation, disassembly, interchange, 
repair, reassembly, alignment, checkout; and 
(ii) Maintenance performed, including modification, testing and reclamation, on 
material requiring repair, major overhaul, or complete rebuild of parts, 
assemblies, subassemblies, and end items; and 
(iii) Software maintenance; and 
(iv) Maintenance performed for continuous airworthiness. 
B. Does not include the manufacture of new items. 
3. Other terms used in this special contract requirement defined in the following 
clauses have the same meaning as set forth in those clauses: 
A. DFARS 252.227-7013; 
B. DFARS 252.227-7014; and 
C. DFARS 252.227-7015. 
(b) Delivery Requirements. The contractor shall deliver all technical data, 
computer software documentation, computer databases, computer software and 
graphics that are necessary or required to support OMIT and having the 
characteristics (e.g., content, format, and delivery medium) necessary for OMIT. 
1. General. The Government requirements for such technical data, computer 
software documentation, computer databases, graphics, and computer software 
include- 
A. No less information or detail than industry standards, nor less than the 
contractor typically requires or uses to perform OMIT activities; and 
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B. Additional information or detail necessary for military purposes related to 
OMIT. 
2. Depot-Level OMIT Data. Depot-level OMIT data includes a complete package 
of technical data, computer software documentation, computer databases, 
graphics and computer software necessary for installation and deinstallation, and 
disassembly and reassembly, at the lowest practicable segregable level. Examples 
of data that are needed to perform depot-level maintenance include, but are not 
limited to, the following: 
A. Detailed <Fill in here> technical data and information regarding all systems; 
B. Depot-level maintenance technical data and information regarding all systems, 
subsystems, and components; and 
C. Interface Control Documents (ICDs). 
(c) License Rights. Contractor hereby grants or shall obtain for the Government 
unlimited rights in all technical data, computer software, computer databases, 
graphics, and computer software documentation necessary for OMIT. Any 
exceptions to this grant for computer software shall be identified and asserted as a 
restriction on computer software pursuant to <Fill in Clause Number & Title> 
and shall include any assertions for 
commercial computer software required for OMIT, which shall be subject to a 
commercial license consistent with DFARS 227.7202-1(a) and <Fill in here> 
clause, Alternate I and Alternate III only. 
(d) Subcontractors and Suppliers. The contractor’s obligations in this special 
contract requirement shall apply to all technical data, computer software 
documentation, computer databases, graphics and computer software, including 
all technical data developed, delivered, or otherwise provided by subcontractors 
and suppliers at any tier; regardless of whether the OMIT data is, or relates to, 
commercial items or noncommercial items. The contractor shall include these 
requirements in its subcontracts or other contractual or legal instruments with its 
subcontractors and suppliers at any tier. The contractor shall ensure all 
subcontractors and suppliers at any tier replicate this clause. 
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(e) Validation of Asserted Restrictions and Restrictive Markings. Nothing in this 
special contract requirement limits or otherwise affects the parties’ rights or 
obligations specified in DFARS 252.227-7019 or 252.227-7037. The Contracting 
Officer reserves the right to validate any asserted restriction or restrictive 
marking, at a later date, in accordance with the procedures of these clauses. 
2. Recommendation 2: Define OMIT Data 
We recommend that the Air Force take the lead and write out a better, more 
inclusive, definition of OMIT data. As mentioned in the early pages of the Data Rights 
Guidebook, Neither the FAR nor the DFARS declares what constitutes OMIT Data 
(Intellectual Property Cross Functional Team, 2019). We see this as an opportunity for the 
Air Force to take the lead within the DOD and formally define what it considers OMIT 
data for different types of procurements.  
The definition of OMIT data would have to change between different types of 
procurements. For instance, OMIT data for an aircraft will look wildly different than OMIT 
data for a computer development. There can be enough similarities in language in large-
scale weapons system procurement that would enable the Air Force to formalize that 
definition. One recommendation is to define OMIT in table format inside the AFFARS or 
in a directive from higher-level contracting professionals.  
We again look to recent procurements for the answer. In both the UH-1N 
Replacement and the T-7A Red Hawk procurement, the definitions of OMIT data are 
incredibly similar, and suggest that the Air Force use their definition as a force-wide 
definition of OMIT data for aircraft, and as contained in the potential fill-in clause in the 
previous recommendation. 
3. Recommendation 3: Improve Intellectual Property Strategy 
Documentation in Acquisition Strategy Development 
The inclusion of the IP strategy requirement in the acquisition strategy for the 
program to assesses the long terms technical data needs of a major weapon system signals 
the importance of the technical data and computer software and license rights. From our 
review of program documentation, we recommend improvements to the IP strategy to 
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define specific sections of the strategy that identify what data is required, how rights in 
data will be verified, how the data will be managed, and how the data will be stored. 
Additionally, we recommend the IP strategy includes a section that addresses clauses 
utilized to determine rights in data, identifying both standard and non-standards clauses.  
Addressing each of these sections within the IP strategy will assist program offices in 
creating actionable strategies. Currently, the IP strategy is not a stand-alone document and 
does not have a required format that promotes standardization of IP strategies across 
programs, which leaves each program to determine what information is included. From our 
review of Air Force weapon systems programs, we identified the UH-1N Replacement 
program created a meaningful format that can be used as a baseline for future intellectual 
property strategies.  
4. Recommendation 4: Increased Education and Training Acquisition 
Community on Intellectual Property 
Our final recommendation is intended to increase the capabilities of the government 
acquisition team to handle intellectual property issues, and to be knowledgeable enough to 
assess requirements and evaluate a contractor’s position in asserting rights in intellectual 
property prior to engaging program legal counsel. The entire acquisition team must be 
knowledgeable on the basic issues in intellectual property to ensure both government and 
industry’s interests are protected. Therefore, we recommend the DOD create mandatory IP 
training in major weapon system program that involves all members of the integrated 
product team. The Air Force in 2019 has created the Smart IP Cadre Office (SAF/AQCC) 
as an intellectual property cadre who will lead the Air Force initiatives focused on solving 
the critical IP issues facing the Air Force, including educating the workforce and 
supporting weapon system programs. We believe the efforts of the IP cadre are going to be 
critical to the DOD creating strategies that increase the knowledge and capability of the 
DOD to procure technical data and computer software license rights.  
C. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
We acknowledge that based on the number of programs reviewed in this project, 
our conclusions should not be used to generalize all weapon system programs across the 
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Air Force, however, the results provide useful insights into the efforts of these programs to 
address intellectual property issues. Future research efforts to increase the number of the 
programs reviewed can provide additional insight into the intellectual property strategies 
of weapon systems across the Air Force and DOD.  
The focus of our research examined the DOD’s acquisition of intellectual property 
by reviewing acquisition planning documents and contract clauses used to obtain license 
rights in technical data and computer software. We acknowledge that issues in intellectual 
property need to be examined across the entire acquisition process to include issues that 
arise during contract performance, delivery of data, and during sustainment of weapon 
systems. Additionally, examination of intellectual property issues across the entire 
acquisition life cycle is necessary for the DOD to ensure its programs implement strategies 
that ensure the long-term sustainment and affordability of weapon systems.  
Areas of future research in intellectual property we did not address in this project 
including evaluation of policy for small business innovative research (SBIR) rights,  
analysis of RFP documents to include CDRLs, SOW, and CLINs, and considerations for 
intellectual property strategies in legacy vs. new systems.  
As the DOD utilizes the findings from the Section 809 Panel, Section 813 Panel, 
and Section 875 study to improve its understanding of issues of intellectual property, and 
DOD weapon system continue to require more technical data and computer software, we 
anticipate the DOD will require new research into data management and intellectual 
property protection. Intellectual property will, without a doubt, continue to be of significant 
importance in future DOD and USAF weapon systems procurement.  
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